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THE INVISIBLE CIRCUMSTANCES OF NOTICE*
ROBIN J. EFFRON**
The due process right of notice—isolated from its close cousin, the opportunity to
be heard—is under-studied and unanalyzed compared to other fundamental
rights. For many litigants and class members, notice does not function
particularly well. This Article provides a new and comprehensive account of
why notice matters as a due process right, why it has been largely ignored, and
what can be done to fix it.
The Supreme Court announced the modern constitutional notice standard in
1950 with the intent of installing a flexible, case-by-case approach that judges
could adapt to the changing circumstances across cases and over time. But this
standard has proved insufficient to account for the broader changes in
circumstances within which litigation and notice take place. This Article
unpacks the invisible circumstances of notice which collectively serve as a
benchmark against which judges and lawmakers evaluate the sufficiency of
notice. The invisible circumstances of notice are a set of shared assumptions
about what “real” or “good notice” is—for example, who serves it and how, who
receives it and where, and what “process” is. The extent to which a proposed
method of notice deviates from the invisible circumstances determines its
constitutional and sub-constitutional acceptability. Once one understands how
the new circumstances of notice no longer fit the old framework, it becomes far
easier to evaluate and promote newer and more technologically advanced
mechanisms of notice because they need not be evaluated against antiquated
benchmarks that reflect older circumstances.
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INTRODUCTION
The due process right of notice is among the most neglected and understudied of constitutional rights. The judicial rhetoric underpinning the right of
notice is lofty, as the Supreme Court periodically invokes its early declaration
that it is a “principle of natural justice which requires a person to have notice of
a suit before he can be conclusively bound by its result.”1 Despite the rhetorical
promise, courts, lawmakers, and commentators have failed to deliver a robust
procedural right of notice. The modern constitutional notice right is governed
by the standard from Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,2 in which
the Supreme Court broke notice and service of process free from the stringent
and overly formal notice practices once deemed a constitutional necessity by
Pennoyer v. Neff.3

1. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 406 (1855); see also St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350,
356 (1882) (quoting Lafayette’s “natural justice” language); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 730 (1878)
(same).
2. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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Although Pennoyer is mostly remembered as a foundational personal
jurisdiction case, Neff’s jurisdictional travails were, at heart, a story about notice
and the service of summons.4 In addition to setting strict territorial limits on a
state’s ability to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident or absent
defendant, Pennoyer established the constitutional primacy of personal, in-hand
service of process on defendants and put substantial limits on the use of
substituted service.5 Pennoyer also enshrined notice as a constitutional due
process right.6 In the traditional telling, Mullane7 displaced the Pennoyer regime
with a flexible and liberal standard for constitutional notice by establishing the
now ubiquitous standard that notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”8 Under this
standard, courts and lawmakers could design and approve rules for service of
process and notice plans that accommodated changing social and economic
circumstances and adapted to the idiosyncratic cost and notification dynamics
of individual lawsuits or mass actions. On closer examination, however, Mullane
was not so much a displacement of Pennoyer as it was a modifier.9 Unpacking
the failures of the modern-day notice reveal that while the due process right of
notice is superficially governed by Mullane’s flexible “reasonably calculated
under the circumstances” standard, constitutional notice is actually ruled by a
set of invisible circumstances that the Court entrenched in its 1950 decision.

4. Mitchell, the plaintiff in the original lawsuit, did not serve Neff personally with the summons
and complaint. Id. at 720. Rather, Mitchell (allegedly) complied with an Oregon statutory requirement
that allowed service by publication when the plaintiff provided an affidavit attesting that he could not,
after due diligence, find and serve a nonresident and absent defendant within the state. Id. After
Mitchell served Neff by publishing a notice for six successive weeks in an Oregon newspaper, Neff did
not appear in the action and the court entered a default judgment. Id. at 719–20.
5. See id. at 727 (explaining that service by publication limited to actions in rem is acceptable
because “[s]ubstituted service by publication, or in any other authorized form, may be sufficient to
inform parties of the object of proceedings taken where property is once brought under the control of
the court by seizure or some equivalent act”); id. at 735–36 (asserting that agents for service of process
are constitutionally permitted as substituted service).
6. Id. at 730 (quoting Lafayette Ins. Co., 59 U.S. at 406).
7. The parties who required notice in Mullane were the beneficiaries of a trust, and the lawsuit
was an equitable “accounting” action required by New York statutory law, the results of which would
be binding on all parties including the beneficiaries. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 307–09. The Supreme Court
held that notice by publication would be sufficient for the unknown beneficiaries, both because of the
difficulty (if not impossibility) and expense of reaching them, and the concomitant holding that the
known beneficiaries receive direct notice. Id. at 317–18.
8. Id. at 314.
9. See Andrew C. Budzinski, Reforming Service of Process: An Access-to-Justice Framework, 90 U.
COLO. L. REV. 167, 170 (2019) (“The barriers erected by stringent service of process rules pose an
access-to-justice problem for pro se plaintiffs.”); Judith Resnik & David Marcus, Inability To Pay: Court
Debt Circa 2020, 98 N.C. L. REV. 361, 361 (2020) (“Commitments to ‘access to justice’ abound. So do
economic barriers that undermine that premise.”).
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Despite Mullane’s promise of flexibility and innovation, courts and
lawmakers have been slow to adapt to modern communications and embrace
mechanisms of notice that harness new technologies. Mullane thus sits at the
center of the puzzle of modern-day notice and service of process.10 The standard
was designed to be flexible and enduring, but innovations in notice practices
have proceeded, at best, in fits and starts.
Compounding the benign neglect by lawmakers, jurists, and
commentators is the sense that the due process right of notice is a back-burner
issue. Why worry about this aspect of procedural due process when so much
else in our procedural house is on fire—shrinking pleading standards and
expanding use of summary judgment, stingy definitions of personal jurisdiction
and the broad enforcement of forum selection clauses and arbitration clauses.
When access to a forum is so imperiled, is this really the moment to cry foul
about poor notice practices? The answer is an emphatic yes, and judges,
lawmakers, and commentators should consider notice to be a core access-tojustice issue.11 Unpacking Mullane’s illusory promise of adaptability is not
enough to truly move notice rights and practices into the twenty-first century.
Instead, we must uncover and challenge the invisible circumstances of notice
that are a barrier to bold and creative reform.
In the past decade, a few scholars have started to reinvigorate notice and
service of process as a civil procedure topic worthy of independent and serious
consideration. These articles have made important contributions to assorted
problems with notice and service of process such as problematic service by and
on natural persons,12 the difficulties in designing and executing successful class
action notice plans,13 and even proposals to reform how businesses and other
entities are served with process.14 But it is important to pull together these
insightful diagnoses and calls for reform into a larger picture because it is not
simply isolated notice practices that are in need of reform. Nor is it sufficient
10. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (“Since
Mullane was decided, we have regularly turned to it when confronted with questions regarding the
adequacy of the method used to give notice.”); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791,
797 (1983) (“[T]his Court has adhered unwaveringly to the principle announced in Mullane.”).
11. See Budzinski, supra note 9, at 170; Resnik & Marcus, supra note 9, at 361.
12. Budzinski, supra note 9, at 169–70 (discussing notice and service of process as an access-tojustice issue for pro se plaintiffs); Adrian Gottshall, Solving Sewer Service: Fighting Fraud with Technology,
70 ARK. L. REV. 813, 816–818 (2018) (describing notoriously bad practices associated with personal inhand service of process).
13. Amanda M. Rose, Classaction.gov, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 491 (2021); Christine P.
Bartholomew, E-Notice, 68 DUKE L.J. 217, 219–20 (2018).
14. See Carliss N. Chatman, Judgment Without Notice: The Unconstitutionality of Constructive Notice
Following Citizens United, 105 KY. L.J. 49, 83–84 (2016) (arguing that corporate withdrawal statutes
violate procedural due process for service to corporations on the secretary of state in light of Citizens
United); Andrew K. Jennings, Notice Risk and Registered Agency, 46 J. CORP. L. 75, 89–90 (2020)
(suggesting a framework by which business entities may be served by email instead of by designating
a registered agent for service of process).
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to plead with state and federal courts to update their understandings of Mullane.
What is truly required is a comprehensive rethinking of the due process nature
and structure of the notice right.
The due process right of notice is relatively understudied and underanalyzed compared to other fundamental rights. Moreover, most of the existing
normative justifications of notice are instrumental. That is, according to these
accounts, notice derives nearly all of its normative power as the facilitator of
the opportunity to be heard. It is the bulwark against the ability of a powerful
sovereign to effect changes to a person’s rights and obligations. While people
are not always entitled to the legal outcome of their choosing or to resist
participating in the adjudicated process altogether,15 there is a sense that they
are entitled to some ability to register discontent and participate in whatever
process is at hand.16 These instrumental accounts of notice are important and
powerful. The rich literature and jurisprudence addressing the opportunity to
be heard is evidence thereof, and I do not mean to suggest that these lines of
inquiry are unimportant. But procedural theorists, it seems, have all but
forgotten to examine whether notice is anything more than an instrumental
right. While the question of when notice is due is clearly foundational, the
“how” and “why” of notice outside of this justification are of equal importance.17
This analytical deficit would be less troubling if the modern American
execution of notice and its mechanics were mostly unproblematic.
Unfortunately, the laws, policies, and practices of notice in America are far from
perfect. For a number of participants in the modern-day adversarial system,
notice does not function particularly well. This is a due process problem for
defendants who do not learn of pending actions,18 for plaintiffs who are unable
to prosecute an action because of difficulties in serving an adversary,19 and for
absent class members who are unaware of an action in which they might want
to participate or file a claim.20
I have hypothesized elsewhere that the reason for the relative disinterest
in these problems is that commentators have erroneously (and mostly
15. Challenging jurisdiction can be one of the few paths to avoiding any sort of merits
entanglement in a case.
16. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
17. Cf. Brandon L. Garrett, Karima Modjadidi & William Crozier, Undeliverable: Suspended
Driver’s Licenses and the Problem of Notice, 4 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 185, 194–95 (2020) (criticizing
a court for focusing on the provision of a hearing as justification for due process but failing to consider
“that many individuals may not receive such a notice [of the suspension or hearing] at their current
address”).
18. See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
19. See Budzinski, supra note 9, at 173 (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects a plaintiff’s right to a
hearing on the merits of her claim at a ‘meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ Service of process
rules that make it impracticable for a plaintiff to serve a defendant deny the plaintiff that right.”).
20. Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 228–34 (describing the due process dimensions to class action
notice).
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implicitly) treated notice as an impediment to plaintiff court access, rather than
as a significant court access doctrine in and of itself.21 This Article aims to revive
an interest in engaging with the conceptual and logistical problems of notice as
a systemic project, rather than addressing problematic aspects of notice on a
piecemeal basis. The modern execution of notice in adversarial proceedings fails
to serve22 many litigants, from the most vulnerable individuals to well-resourced
businesses. Notice and service of process deserve deeper investigation. Siloed
inquiries into individual problems scattered across the litigation landscape have
prevented scholars from seeing the larger doctrinal and conceptual problems
embedded in the Pennoyer/Mullane framework.
Mullane’s case-by-case approach contains the seeds of judicial adaptability.
It has been capacious enough that, for the most part, the standard has not been
a total roadblock to procedural innovations.23 As this Article demonstrates, the
context-specific approach allows judges to consider the individual constellation
of costs and logistics in any case in which the sufficiency of service of process
or a plan for notice is contested. The paradox of Mullane is that, by encouraging
judges to consider the individual circumstances of the parties and case before
them, judges have failed to see the broader changes in circumstances within
which litigation and notice take place. Superficially, it might appear as if courts
are considering the individual circumstances of each case. However, judges are
still judging the reasonableness of rules and applications thereof against a
background of circumstances that no longer reflects the state of the world today.
This Article suggests that notice innovations are only possible with a
fundamental rethinking of the constitutional notice paradigm. Upon closer
examination, Mullane did not truly break with the past. Instead, it updated and
augmented the Pennoyer framework to form a paradigm that anchors notice in
older norms and practices rendering it stubbornly resistant to change. In the
post-Mullane decades, judges and lawmakers consider surface level
“circumstances” of notice and service. But for decades, a deeper set of
“invisible” circumstances of notice have gone unnoticed and underappreciated.
Only by uncovering and discarding these invisible circumstances will judges
and lawmakers be free to create and evaluate new rules and paradigms. This
Article is dedicated to establishing a better accounting of the circumstances of
notice that is entirely within Mullane’s flexible standard. When Justice Jackson
wrote that notice must be reasonable “under the circumstances,” he was, of
course, referring to the specific circumstances of the parties to the lawsuit—the
21. Robin J. Effron, Putting the “Notice” Back into Pleading, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 981, 987–89
(2020) [hereinafter Effron, Putting the “Notice” Back into Pleading] (suggesting that notice is understudied because of the “court-access conundrum”).
22. Pun intended!
23. The most notable innovation is the slow but inevitable migration to electronic means of notice
and service of process, particularly in class actions. See infra Section II.D.
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logistical feasibility of a notice plan and its relative costs.24 But the result of
Mullane’s case-by-case approach to notice was the entrenchment of a deeper set
of background circumstances of notice—circumstances that held sway over the
judicial imagination since before Pennoyer and the Fourteenth Amendment
constitutionalized the concept of notice.
These are the invisible circumstances of notice. They are a set of shared
assumptions about what “real” or “good notice” is—who serves it and how; who
receives it and where; and what “process” is, as well as the extent to which other
forms of service25 deviate from the Pennoyer/Mullane world of invisible
circumstances. These circumstances also determine their constitutional and subconstitutional acceptability.
The invisible circumstances of notice center around five core attributes of
in-hand personal service, the paradigm of ideal notice and service from the
Pennoyer era: (1) delivery of physical papers; (2) by a natural person (the process
server); (3) to another natural person; (4) who is the person to whom the notice
is addressed;26 (5) in a “traditional” lawsuit in which each claimant or defendant
is a named party to the action. Every other form of notice and service is defined
and evaluated by its adherence to or distance from these five attributes.
These five attributes supply the organization structure of the analysis and
argument in this Article which proceeds in three parts. The first two parts are
dedicated to uncovering how the five core attributes—thought to be long
discarded as mandates—continue to dominate how notice rules are promulgated
and how notice plans and practices are evaluated. Part I addresses the first two
attributes: the circumstance of “process” and how the ideal of tangible paper has
constrained progress. Part II considers the second two attributes which
encapsulate the circumstances of service, namely, how a reliance on the
importance of natural persons has distorted and stalled efforts to modernize
notice practices. Part III investigates the circumstances of litigation itself and
24. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317–19 (1950) (recognizing and
weighing the inherent costs in notifying large numbers of beneficiaries).
25. Many of these are tellingly denominated “substituted service.” Substituted service or
constructive notice is “[s]ervice accomplished by a method or circumstance that does not give actual
notice.” Service, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
26. Or, in the case of a business or other entity, is a natural person who is as synonymous with
the entity as possible. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.081 (Westlaw current with laws and joint
resolutions in effect from the 2021 1st Reg. Sess. and Spec. “A” Sess. of the 27th Leg.) (stating that if
service cannot be made on a registered agent of the corporation, service of process shall be permitted
on any employee at the corporation’s principal place of business or on any employee of the registered
agent); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.20 (Westlaw current with urgency legislation through Ch. 145
of 2021 Reg. Sess.) (explaining that in lieu of personal delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint
to a registered agent or officer of the corporation, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the
summons and complaint during usual office hours in a registered agent or officer’s office); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-58-124(a) (LEXIS through all legislation of the 2021 Reg. Sess.) (stating that in the absence
of service on listed corporate officers, it may be served upon the cashier, treasurer, secretary, clerk, or
agent of the corporation).
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argues that the Pennoyer/Mullane model does not capture the new landscape of
modern American litigation and explains how notice and service of process must
adapt to account for these changes. Finally, in Part IV, this Article concludes
by suggesting that lawmakers and courts must rethink the “circumstances of the
circumstances,” the idea that the circumstances of notice are unique to each
lawsuit and arrive fully formed. Contrary to this implicit assumption, courts
and lawmakers are active participants in creating and maintaining the invisible
circumstances of notice. Lawmakers should not wait for the circumstances of
notice to change—key changes can be forged by the state and the judiciary itself.
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PROCESS
The “new” standard for notice is actually an expansion and reification of
the old. This Article unpacks the hidden contents of the Pennoyer/Mullane
standard, which is the benchmark against which judges and lawmakers evaluate
the sufficiency of new tools and methods. The current permissibility of such
innovations depends on how closely they mimic or improve an existing
hierarchy of old methods. This reconceptualization of Mullane is more than just
an academic exercise. Once one understands how the new circumstances of
notice no longer fit the old framework, it becomes far easier to evaluate and
promote newer and more technologically advanced methods of notice because
they need not be evaluated against antiquated benchmarks that reflect older
circumstances. Thus, a conceptual move away from the process-as-paper model
would make room for electronic notice (“e-notice”) to exist coequally with
traditional paper process.
In-hand, personal service sits atop the hierarchy of preferred notice
methods. This platonic ideal is the direct descendent of the old English capias
ad respondendum in which a defendant was “served” by being arrested and
physically held until adjudicated by the state.27 Pennoyer enshrined in-hand,
personal service in the territory of the forum state as sine qua non of
constitutional notice.28 Although other methods of substituted service had been
in use for decades prior, the Pennoyer Court confirmed the notion that such
methods were suboptimal and only to be used in specially circumscribed
circumstances.29
In the decades between Pennoyer and Mullane, the strict adherence to the
primacy of in-hand service became untenable, just as Pennoyer’s rigid

27. See Robin J. Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal Jurisdiction, 74 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 23, 32 (2018) [hereinafter Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal Jurisdiction].
28. See RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 130 (2004).
29. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878) (describing the limited situations in which
“[s]ubstituted service by publication, or in any other authorized form, may be sufficient”).
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territorialism strained the practicability of personal jurisdiction.30 Pennoyer’s
idealized circumstances had never been a ubiquitous reality. But the
circumstances of parties, process, and lawsuits had changed enough by the
middle of the twentieth century that the Court recognized newer circumstances
that called for a more flexible constitutional framework.31
Mullane, then, was itself the culmination of changed circumstances: the
ubiquity and reliability of first-class mail, the growing prevalence of complex
suits, and the growing need to inform their multiple participants. The Supreme
Court intended for Mullane to normalize “newer” forms of substituted service
and notice plans in complex cases, but it also meant for Mullane’s standard to
be capacious enough to account for the not-yet-known financial and logistical
predicaments that litigants of the future would face in executing notice. It
succeeded in the former but did not in the latter. Rather, Mullane enlarged the
generic ideal of the circumstances of notice so that a rule or notice plan could
be evaluated by its distance from Mullane’s ideal almost as much as it could from
Pennoyer’s ideal.
A.

Questioning the Primacy of Paper

For most of Anglo-American legal history, “process” meant something
very particular. It was a tangible thing—a document or set of documents—that
could be held by the server or recipient and physically transferred from one set
of hands to another.32 The question of whether process from one jurisdiction
could cross over into another and be delivered to persons there exerted
tremendous power over the judicial imagination—especially when paired with
questions about the personal jurisdiction of the courts of a forum state.33
The primacy of physical paper documents was as central to the world of
Mullane as it was to Pennoyer’s. In adversarial litigation, notice is tantamount to
process. Mullane jump-started the serious constitutional contemplation of other
kinds of notice sent to absent parties in complex cases, but it also carried forward
Pennoyer’s unquestioned assumption that “process” was tantamount to a set of
paper documents. Until the late twentieth century, it was hard to conceive of
alternatives to “process-as-documents.” The closest thing to an alternative form
of process would have been notice by publication, a form of notice that courts

30. WASSERMAN, supra note 28, at 212–19 (describing the evolution of doctrine between Pennoyer
and International Shoe and the persistent problems of reaching absent defendants).
31. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950) (“However it may have
been in former times, the mails today are recognized as an efficient and inexpensive means of
communication.”).
32. Max Crema & Lawrence B. Solum, The Original Meaning of “Due Process of Law” in the Fifth
Amendment, 108 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
33. WASSERMAN, supra note 28, at 130.
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and commentators viewed with deep skepticism as a method of last resort.34
While publications were still tangible items (newspapers, trade journals, papers
tacked to wall in a town square and the like), they were not documents that
could be passed into the possession of another person or entity. This was one
reason that notice by publication was viewed as a poor alternative to personal
in-hand service. Although a printed newspaper is a tangible object, one could
not be sure that the intended recipient would ever possess it, let alone read it.
Skepticism about publication notice entrenched two related assumptions
that form an invisible “circumstance of notice.” The first was the assumption
that process equals paper documents. The second is that any alternative to
process-as-documents, especially publication notice, is inherently inferior.
While these background assumptions made some sense in the paper and analog
world of the Pennoyer/Mullane paradigm, it is time to investigate whether either
of these assumptions hold true in the twenty-first century. To do so, it is worth
taking each of these assumptions in turn.
Until very recently, no judge or lawmaker had reason to imagine that
“process” would consist of anything besides tangible paper documents. Short of
the unreliable and unverifiable practice of verbal communication, the service of
paper documents was the only way to transmit notice of the pendency of an
action or proceeding to an interested party. Because this was as true in 1950 as
it was in 1877, Mullane did nothing to disturb this background assumption of
notice. The “circumstance” of notice in adversarial litigation was that notice was
tantamount to service of process, and service of process meant paper
documents. The innovation in Mullane was to widen the lens of what
prototypical service of process meant, namely by elevating first-class mail to a
higher status of acceptability within the background hierarchy of acceptable
notice practices against which all future rules and notice plans would be
evaluated.
The primacy of paper in the Pennoyer/Mullane model solidified two
subsidiary assumptions in the invisible circumstances of notice. First, that
process must either be paper, or second, that process must look as much like
paper as possible. These two assumptions are responsible for the sluggish pace
of adapting new technologies for use in notice and service of process.
The assumption is so fundamental to modern conceptions of process that
one hardly notices it at all. Paper documents look official. They are tangible
manifestations of notice. Tangible documents connect litigants to the long
historical tradition of state assertion over parties by connecting these parties to
physical pieces of paper; recall that pre-International Shoe judges grounded their
trust in the in-person transmission of process as the “modern” manifestation of

34. See Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 51–52.
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the capias ad respondendum.35 For a process that has its origins in the physical
restraint of the defendant, it is no surprise that tangible documents persist as a
totem of state power.
However, the circumstances of notice have changed. Paper is no longer
the default or even dominant medium for conveying written information.36 Yet
the powerful process-as-paper assumption has such gravitational pull on what
sort of notice is “reasonable” under the circumstances, that courts and
commentators are barely aware of just how slowly they have adapted to the new
technological circumstances of the twenty-first century.
The use of electronic (intangible) notice is still so suspect that its use has
been limited to “exceptional” forms of litigation,37 or to systems of electronic
filing and transmission that are only available to parties who are represented by
counsel who have access to the system. The New York State Court Electronic
Filing System (“NYSCEF”) is illustrative. The NYSCEF touts itself as fast,
time saving, and available day and night.38 The information that this website
presents for lawyers and unrepresented parties provides overview and
assistance. It gives information for serving or receiving filings electronically and
paints a picture that this is a comprehensive electronic filing system, even
emphasizing the many categories of cases for which e-filing is mandatory for
parties represented by counsel.39
While this may be true for the transmission of documents and information
in cases that are already underway, when it comes to notice and service of
process, New York still clings to a paper-centric system. First, NYSCEF is not
truly comprehensive or universal. While it is possible for most cases to be filed
electronically,40 this does not mean that there is a comprehensive platform for
most parties to be served electronically. In fact, when it comes to the
35. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (linking modern in personam
jurisdiction to the original practice of capias ad respondendum).
36. See Frank Newport, The New Era of Communication Among Americans, GALLUP (Nov. 10,
2014), https://news.gallup.com/poll/179288/new-era-communication-americans.aspx [https://perma.cc
/QA8C-FUCV] (“Texting, using a cellphone and sending and reading email messages are the most
frequently used forms of nonpersonal communication for adult Americans.”).
37. Thus, the circumstances of paper notice are connected with another circumstance discussed
below, namely, the assumptions about what “normal” litigation looks like. See infra notes 38–43 and
accompanying text.
38. New York State Courts E-Filing (NYSCEF) Unrepresented Litigants Fact
Sheet, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://iappscontent.courts.state.ny.us/NYSCEF/live/help/
UnrepresentedFactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/QRL4-8FHQ].
39. See Authorized for E-Filing, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/
nyscef/AuthorizeCaseType [https://perma.cc/RK4B-D9SH] (choose court from drop-down menu and
press “select”).
40. Each of New York’s judicial subdivisions lists the cases for which e-filing is “mandatory.”
However, unrepresented parties always have the option of choosing e-filing or traditional courthouseand-paper filing. See New York State Courts E-Filing (NYSCEF) Unrepresented Litigants Fact Sheet, supra
note 38.
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commencement of an action, “papers must be served in hard copy pursuant to
the Civil Practice Law and Rules together with the appropriate Notice of
Electronic Filing.”41 The only scenario in which a plaintiff can avoid traditional
hard copy of service of process is if the adverse party “is a registered NYSCEF
user, consents to the use of e-filing in the case, and agrees to accept electronic
service of the initiating documents.”42 Thus, this exception only captures true
“repeat players” in the New York court system, as even large businesses often
have not retained counsel to represent them in matters that have not yet
materialized. Natural persons and foreign corporations in particular are unlikely
to fall into this narrow exception.
Thus, for all its advertised promise of speed, ease, and modernization, the
NYSCEF, like the electronic filing systems in most other jurisdictions,43 exists
amidst the invisible circumstances of the Pennoyer/Mullane hierarchy. When it
comes to notice (as opposed to filing or service of other documents beyond the
summons and complaint), paper reigns supreme. In most U.S. jurisdictions,
paper documents are the bedrock of notice. Alternative electronic methods of
service are treated as suspect and must be justified either by duplicative paper
efforts, or by the reassurance that plaintiffs will only be permitted to sidestep
the use of paper documents in a small subset of cases.
Jurisdictions like New York have constructed e-filing systems but not enotice systems. The lawmakers and court administrators are still caught in the
invisible circumstances of the Pennoyer/Mullane model which prizes both paper
and the human transmission of it. Jurisdictions that require traditional service
of paper documents at the commencement of an e-filed lawsuit presume to
provide a higher degree of assurance that notice will be actual and not merely
constructive.
One of the conceptual barriers to turning an e-filing system into an enotice system is a resistance to minimizing the role of human interaction in
delivering and receiving notice.44 But in the modern circumstances of notice,
there is no reason to automatically privilege paper over electronic
communication as the more reliable or effective form of process. For many
people in the modern world, paper does not hold the status, importance, or
41. User Manual for Supreme Court and Court of Claims Cases, N.Y. STATE
UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://iappscontent.courts.state.ny.us/NYSCEF/live/training/userManual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MAH9-DGPZ].
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Virginia Judiciary E-Filing System (VJEFS), VA.’S JUD. SYS., http://www.courts.state.
va.us/online/vjefs/home.html [https://perma.cc/8ZE5-XTED] (allowing filing for registered parties
but not service of process); Frequently Asked Questions, N.J. ECOURTS, https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/
assets/ecourts/ecourtsfaq.pdf?c=yQu [https://perma.cc/ZKW5-FG2C] (restricting New Jersey’s
eCourt system to attorney use in almost all cases and refusing to provide for electronic service of
process).
44. See infra Section I.B.
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“seriousness” that it once signified. Text messages ping. Email is checked with
regularity. Social media accounts provide an endless supply of content
notifications. But, for many people, the arrival of a piece of paper no longer
triggers the sense of urgency and importance of years past.45 An electronic
communication can be designed to look and feel as important and official as a
piece of paper.
Additionally, pieces of paper are not foolproof methods of
communication. In fact, the tendency for paper to be lost or discarded, never to
be seen again, explains the heavy historical preference for in-hand, rather than
substituted service. Lower income defendants, or those in precarious personal
circumstances are more likely to be victims of sewer service—a practice of
falsifying service affidavits for process that has been thrown in a figurative
“sewer” rather than delivered to the intended party.46 These practices are not
isolated instances—a recent journalistic exposé showed widespread problems
with affidavits of service in eviction cases in Washington, D.C., leading to the
eviction of many low-income tenants.47
Beyond sewer service, businesses can fall prey to human errors that
periodically prevent paper documents from reaching the right hands.48 In one
notorious example, a summons and complaint in a Wisconsin action against
PepsiCo were served on Pepsi’s registered agent in North Carolina. The
documents that the agent allegedly forwarded to Pepsi’s headquarters in New
York were not received by Pepsi’s in-house counsel, nor his assistant. This
eventually resulted in the Wisconsin court entering a $1.26 billion default
judgment against Pepsi.49 Perhaps if Pepsi had been able to participate in a well45. Brad Adgate, Newspaper Revenue Drops as Local News Interest Rises Amid Coronavirus, FORBES
(Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradadgate/2020/04/13/newspapers-are-strugglingwith-coronavirus/?sh=27109bc439ef [https://perma.cc/8KV6-Q34G (dark archive)] (outlining
reduction in circulation and ad revenue of paper newspaper, a trend that has ironically been exacerbated
by the coronavirus pandemic despite an increase of interest in news); see Tony Rogers, Why Newspapers
Are Still Important, THOUGHT CO., https://www.thoughtco.com/why-newspapers-are-still-important2074263 [https://perma.cc/8XPN-Q3NL] (describing the decline in circulation of paper newspapers)
(last updated July 3, 2019).
46. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
47. Josh Kaplan, Thousands of D.C. Renters Are Evicted Every Year. Do They All Know To Show Up
to Court?, DCIST (Oct. 5, 2020), https://dcist.com/story/20/10/05/thousands-of-d-c-renters-areevicted-every-year-do-they-all-know-to-show-up-to-court/ [https://perma.cc/W6GU-RDLV]. The
exposé led to action by the D.C. Council strengthening notice requirements in eviction cases. See B230940-Fairness in Renting Emergency Amendment Act of 2020, COUNCIL OF D.C., https://lims.dccouncil.
us/Legislation/B23-0940 [https://perma.cc/2A53-7BUL].
48. See Jennings, supra note 14, at 87–88 (documenting the problems with human transmission of
documents when serving business entities).
49. Joyce v. Pepsico, Inc., 2012 WI App 52, ¶ 6, 340 Wis. 2d 740, 813 N.W.2d 247, Nos.
2010AP2148, 2010AP2149, 2010AP2150, 2011AP117, 2012 WL 1033468, at *1 (2012) (unpublished table
decision). Pepsi managed to convince the court to vacate the default judgment. Id. But it was not
without the expense of extra motion practice and the embarrassment that came with publicity of the
incident. See, e.g., Erin Geiger Smith, Pepsi Nailed with $1.26 Billion Judgment After Secretary’s Mistake,
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designed and widely used electronic notification system—particularly one that
utilizes secure, cloud-based technology—it would have been less susceptible to
the human error that led to the embarrassing default judgment.50
To be clear, none of this is to say that e-notice is superior to paper. For
natural persons who are not digital natives or do not have reliable access to a
computer or internet-connected device, paper documents are still more
effective. In other circumstances, paper is so crucial that it should be given more
protection than the Supreme Court has currently given. For example, for
incarcerated persons, ensuring actual delivery of a tangible document should be
of the highest priority. None of this is to say that paper notice and service of
process is of no value whatsoever. Paper likely will persist in our systems for
quite some time as a primary means of notice for some parties and as a backup
or backstop for others.
The point, then, is not to replace paper process with e-notice, but to shake
courts and lawmakers loose from the assumption that any departure from paper
process must be deeply constrained and meticulously justified.
B.

Thinking Beyond Paper Replicas in the Design of Electronic Communications

The assumption that notice and process must almost always be a tangible
document has been a major roadblock to the development of mold-breaking enotice systems that would enable widespread and simplified service of process
via electronic means. Class action notice is one of the few areas where courts
have slowly begun to harness the power of electronic communication by using
e-notice. Class action notice is logistically difficult and often expensive.51 Notice
is challenging due to the inherent nature of class actions themselves.52 As
representative actions, class actions necessarily include absent claimants, many
of whose identities and whereabouts can be difficult and possibly expensive to
obtain.53 Many class action lawsuits are “opt-out” class actions, meaning that
class members can opt out of the litigation, reserving their own rights to pursue

BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 28, 2009, 8:02 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/pepsi-nailed-with-126billion-judgment-after-secretarys-mistake-2009-10 [https://perma.cc/F5HN-LREJ (dark archive)].
50. See Jennings, supra note 14, at 87.
51. Robert H. Klonoff, Mark Hermann & Bradley W. Harrison, Making Class Actions Work: The
Untapped Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 727, 730 (2008) (“Courts and commentators have
long struggled with the difficulties associated with providing ‘the best notice that is practicable under
the circumstances.’”); Rose, supra note 13, at 489 (“[I]dentifying potential class members is often a
difficult and expensive task, and the cost of the effort may reduce the pro rata amount class members
making claims will receive.”).
52. For a comprehensive summary of the relationship between procedural due process in notice
and the class action notice requirements in Rule 23, see Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 228–34.
53. See John C. Coffee Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 381 (2000).
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individual actions against the defendants.54 However, even in the limited
circumstances in which courts and lawmakers have begun to authorize e-notice,
progress is hampered by a second assumption which is that e-notice should be
the electronic delivery of a picture of the document that would otherwise be
delivered in tangible form.
Notice is the due process lynchpin in the opt-out class action system.
Effective communication regarding the pendency of the action and any
proposed settlement is what allows a court to enter a judgment that binds all
class members.55 In federal court, the notice requirements found in Rule 23 are
meant to ensure that class members learn of the action in time to participate or
opt out,56 or to object to a proposed settlement.57 Many state class action rules
contain similar provisions and requirements.58
Class action notice has received far more attention than other arenas of
adversarial litigation. As a result, a number of commentators, judges, agencies,
and advocacy groups have produced some reforms and reform proposals based
on best practices over the past few decades.59 Since the late 1990s, commentators
have seized on electronic communication and publication as possibilities for
cheaper and more effective notice.60 Despite these modest innovations in notice
practices, effective use of technology in class notice plans is far from universal,
and claims rates remain “dismally low.”61
As Professor Rose has argued, subpar notice practices contribute to low
claim participation rates—either because not enough class members have been
notified of the action,62 or because the nature of the notice itself imposes
unacceptably high processing costs on the claimant who might decide that the

54. See Jay Tidmarsh & Roger H. Transgrud, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
139–40 (2d ed. 2018) (describing opt-out class actions).
55. See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1786 (3d ed. 2021) (discussing how the concepts of notice and due process are central
to Rule 23 and the procedure regarding a class action lawsuit); id. § 1753.1 (discussing how a plethora
of revisions to Rule 23 have emphasized the concept of notice).
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Even in so-called “mandatory classes,” notice is still important
enough that Rule 23 instructs judges that they “may direct appropriate notice to the class.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(5)(A).
58. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-803, 5/2-806 (Westlaw through the end of the 2020 Reg.
Sess. of the 101st Gen. Assemb.) (detailing Illinois class action notice requirements); Faulkenbury v.
Tchrs.’ & State Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of N.C., 345 N.C. 683, 697, 483 S.E.2d 422, 431 (1997) (interpreting
North Carolina’s state class action rule to require notice).
59. See, e.g., Judges’ Class Action Notice and Claims Process Checklist and Plain Language Guide, FED.
JUD. CTR. (2010), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/NotCheck.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2JDWJ7A]. Most notably, Rule 23 was amended to adopt the requirement that class action notice must use
plain and easily understood language. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
60. Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 232–36; Rose, supra note 13, at 503–04.
61. Rose, supra note 13, at 490–91 (posing this discrepancy as “puzzling”).
62. Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 218–20.
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time and effort needed to read and understand the notice and verification
outweigh any nominal compensation that would flow from filing a claim.63
Despite the slow progress and stubborn persistence of low participation rates,
the benefits of e-notice should not be ignored. As Professor Bartholomew has
observed, class action objectors, whose participation can often sharpen the value
of a settlement for class members, “are almost twice as common in cases
involving E-notice.”64 Notice methods must be pervasive, standardized, and
break free from the unhelpful benchmark of individual letters sent by first-class
mail.
Jurists view Mullane as an innovative and flexible standard, but its facts
centered the primacy of first-class mail as the gold standard for notifying large
groups of claimants about an action. The Supreme Court cemented this bias in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,65 which addressed class action notice to unknown,
absent class members and unknown beneficiaries.66 Eisen required that
“individual notice . . . be sent to all class members who can be identified through
reasonable effort,” that the high cost of mailing such notice did not alter this
requirement, and that the class could not shift the cost of notice to the
defendant.67 This mirrored the Mullane picture that the presence of unknown
claimants would not destroy the action altogether because of the
impracticability of identifying and notifying all possible claimants, but that
notice to the known claimants was needed to protect the interests of the
unknown class members.68 The one-two punch of the Court giving its
imprimatur to the cumbersome and expensive method of first-class mail in
Mullane and Eisen reaffirmed first-class mail as the yardstick by which all other
mass action notice plans would be evaluated.69
Although the Supreme Court handed down Eisen in 1974, first-class mail
is still quite present in the class action notice plans that trial judges approve

63. Rose, supra note 13, passim (stating that the central argument is that verification and trust
costs on the part of the class member are a major barrier to increasing class participation, even when
notice is received). Professor Rose also discusses the “claims processing costs” involved with filing the
actual claim which, while related to notice, are not actual “notice costs” themselves. Id.; see also Jessica
Erickson, Automating Securities Class Action Settlements, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1817, 1850–51 (2019); cf.
Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 248–49 (“[R]esearch on online ads [for class action settlements]
confirms, even in the absence of clicks, such ads still ‘reach’ individuals—and do so quite effectively.”).
64. Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 258.
65. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
66. Id. at 175.
67. Id. at 157–58.
68. Id. at 175–77.
69. Note that first class mail in the time of Mullane and Eisen was certainly less cumbersome and
expensive than in-hand service of process and dispensing with notice altogether would have been
unconstitutional. Thus, what seemed like the least expensive and cumbersome solution in its day has
now become the slower and costlier option.
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across the state and federal courts.70 The reluctance to wholeheartedly embrace
electronic solutions to class action notice has been well documented, but the
root of this hesitancy has yet to be fully explained.71 Mullane’s case-by-case
approach promised progress, but the mechanics of common-law reasoning left
courts constantly looking backwards to assess new notice plans against old
methods and metrics.72 Moreover, “fear of change, imperfection, and
technology leave some courts clinging to mail and publication notice as the
primary means of satisfying procedural due process.”73 Accordingly, courts
often approve notice plans that utilize these traditional methods without
analyzing whether there are more practical methods of notice available,74 citing
the Supreme Court’s history of endorsing notice by first-class mail,75 or relying
on earlier cases holding that notice by publication in a newspaper is constructive
notice and therefore satisfies due process.76
Many of the emails that courts and settlement administrators send out
resemble the paper documents or postcards that preceded email technology.
They consist primarily of plain text with few differentiated fonts, and perhaps
one or two links to a website with further information about the pending
litigation or proposed settlement.77
These plain text, legally dense, and minimally interactive notices might be
cheaper than printing and mailing hundreds of thousands of print notices, but
they have little else to recommend them as models of improved notice. It is a
parallel tale to the way many periodicals approached publication in the early
days of the internet, namely, by posting pictures of periodical pages or very
lightly hyperlinked versions of the print versions of the newspaper or

70. Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 237 (explaining that in data collected from 2005–2017, “76
percent [of judges] approve[d] notice by direct mail, publication through magazines or newspapers, or
a settlement webpage”); id. at 222 (“[T]he FJC equates mail notice with the ideal notice, going so far
as to caution judges against approving E-Notice.”).
71. As I will argue, the supposed flexibility of the Mullane standard is somewhat illusory, as it
takes certain background “circumstances” for granted and thus treats notice problems as issues of
individual variations in context rather than as a standard that requires a periodic full overhaul of
contextual understanding.
72. Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 238.
73. Id. at 223–24; see also Reab v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 214 F.R.D. 623, 630 (D. Colo. 2002)
(“Electronic communication inherently has the potential to be copied and forwarded to other people
via the internet with commentary that could distort the notice approved by the Court.”).
74. Alexander W. Aiken, Comment, Class Action Notice in the Digital Age, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 967,
981 (2017). For example, the Tenth Circuit approved notice of settlement by first-class mail without
analyzing whether there were more practical methods available to notify class members. Fager v.
CenturyLink Commc’ns, LLC, 854 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2016).
75. Fager, 854 F.3d. at 1173.
76. Klein v. O’Neal, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 632, 663–64 (N.D. Tex. 2010); see also In re MetLife
Demutualization Litig., 262 F.R.D. 205, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding publication notice in securities
class action was sufficient and email or other electronic means of notice were not necessary).
77. See Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 237 n.116.
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magazine.78 Class action notice administrators should be more aggressive in
approaching notices as a fundamentally different medium than “the email
version of the letter.” Class action notice plans have already begun to do this by
utilizing social media, targeted advertising, and the like.79 But the individual
notices themselves are hardly different than the paper notices that some courts
still insist on sending to class members.80
With little added expense, e-notice can include design elements of color,
font, spacing,81 and more extensive use of hyperlinks to relevant information.
The putative class member can be directed to clear information not only about
the pending action or settlement, but general information about the rights of
class members in the relevant jurisdiction or about the product or incident at
issue. By providing separate links to distinct pages, the notices can avoid the
pitfalls of needing to convey all necessary information in small print crammed
onto a few sheets of paper. While some class actions have begun to make better
use of these design tools, the “process-as-paper” model will continue to stifle
creativity and innovation until courts and commentators have broken free from
the Pennoyer/Mullane model.
The process-as-paper model permeates the limited uses of e-notice in
ordinary litigation as well. Class action notices have been at the forefront of
innovation (however timid) because the necessity of cheaper methods of
distribution to large numbers of absent class members forced courts and
litigants to embrace some degree of e-notice.82 But in noncomplex litigation, enotice is still in its infancy. In the NYSCEF system, for example, e-notice
consists of the electronic transmission of PDF documents of the summons,
complaint, and other supporting documents.83 Although the serving party
78. See generally Deniz Bokesoy, E-newspapers: Revolution or Evolution?, 1 SCROLL: ESSAYS ON
DESIGN ELEC. TEXT, no. 1, 2008, at 1, https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/43819/1/Enewspapers_Revolution%20or%20Evolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/RPT7-P696] (discussing history of
design and layout of e-newspapers).
79. See Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 257 (describing social medial and targeted advertising as
used in class action notice); Elizabeth M.C. Scheibel, #Rule23 #Classaction Notice: Using Social Media,
Text Messaging, and Other New Communications Technology for Class Action Notice and Returning to Rule
23(c)(2)(B)’s “Best Notice Practicable” Standard, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1331 passim (2016).
80. See Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 260–64.
81. For example, strategic use of different colors and larger fonts for selected words and phrases
can draw the reader’s attention to important pieces of information such as the subject matter of the
action (as opposed to the case caption which may or may not be indictive of the subject of the class
action itself), the recipient’s unique claim number, and any important dates or deadlines. Spacing can
be used to set apart important information for easy visual access, such as a menu of award options from
which a class member can choose. Hyperlinks can visually highlight text (when they remain underlined)
and can direct class members to specific information about class actions generally, such as the court in
which the action is pending, the identity of law firms involved, and further information specific to the
case. The advantage of hyperlinks is that it can slim down the notice itself—much of what might be
“small print” that clutters a paper message can be stored as hyperlinked information.
82. See Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 222–23.
83. User Manual for Supreme Court and Court of Claims Cases, supra note 41.
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enters some basic information that becomes metadata alongside the documents,
the service of process is just an electronic form of what a process server might
have handed to the defendant in person. Because e-notice in this system can
only be deployed against parties who are already represented by counsel and
have registered with and consented to NYSCEF, the verisimilitude to paper
documents is neither here nor there—the law firms representing the e-service
registered clients assimilate and process the PDF documents with ease. For
sophisticated litigants, e-service of PDF documents is frictionless, and the
parties have little reason to imagine and advocate for innovations in the form
of e-served process that might have advantages for other parties.
Service of e-notice may be considerably cheaper and logistically easier for
both plaintiffs and defendants, a point addressed at length below. But the form
of process itself that litigants serve could also reflect the new circumstances of
technology and information transmission in ways that benefit litigants. Just as
courts and litigants designing class action notices have begun to experiment
with better uses of email and electronic communication to make notices
accessible, comprehensible, and convey the importance of the underlying action,
lawmakers designing a system of e-notice for “ordinary” litigation can do the
same.
A summons and complaint contain the necessary information for a
defendant to know they have been sued, know where to appear and how to
respond, and know the grounds of the action so that the defendant can begin to
prepare a response.84 While the information is meant to be comprehensive, the
format and language used to present it are not always comprehensible to lay
people.85 Thus, many of the standard summons forms recommended by state
judicial systems contain boilerplate information including the website address
providing further information for litigants.86 Imagine if, instead, an e-summons
and e-complaint contained a series of hyperlinks, creating a useful annotated
84. For a concise history of pleading and its purposes, see Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading
Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 109–14 (2009).
85. See, e.g., Volkswagen 3.0-Liter Diesel Emissions Class Action Settlement, https://www.
vwcourtsettlement.com/en/docs/3Liter/Notices/VW%203L%20Settlement%20Notice.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/Y92Z-NZ6D] (displaying the class notice for the VW emissions case, which is comprised of
forty-six pages of legal terms and instructions for class members); see also Official Court-Approved Legal
Notice: Settlements with Ram and Jeep EcoDiesel Vehicle Owners/Lessees, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the California Air Resources Board, https://www.ecodieselsettlement.com/
content/dam/fcacourtsettlement/pdf/Long%20Form%20Notice.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ97-QXU6]
(displaying the class notice from the Fiat Chrysler emissions case which is comprised of twenty-two
pages of legal terms and instructions for class members).
86. See, e.g., Supreme Court of the State of New York Summons, https://www.nycourts.gov/
LegacyPDFS/courts/11jd/supreme/civilterm/CH-FORMS/Summons%20Complaint%20and%20
Answers/summons.pdf [https://perma.cc/SEJ4-DRC6]; California Family Court Form of Summons,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/fl110.pdf [https://perma.cc/5T25-JAQ5]; Instructions for Florida
Family Law Rules of Procedure from 12.910(a) Summons: Personal Service on an Individual (Mar. 2017),
https://www.flcourts.org/content/download/403082/file/12-910a.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA2E-8JPF].
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document of sorts. The links would contain the most mundane information (a
map of the courthouse with driving and public transit directions enabled) as
well as more sophisticated legal information, such as links to the publicly
available explanations of statutes of limitations, filing deadlines, available
motions and responses, and the like.
Hyperlinked text is only the beginning (and probably the most simplistic)
of ideas for transforming process from paper documents to electronic and
interactive communications. The creative possibilities for the form and design
of notice and process undoubtedly outstrip what I can imagine at the time of
this writing, or even what tech-savvier people than I can envision at this
moment.87 What does seem certain, however, is that very little innovation can
take place when courts, lawmakers, litigators, and the third-party suppliers of
litigation tools remain conceptually chained to the process-as-paper model. It is
telling that many jurisdictions have adopted systems for e-filing but were unable
to adapt these systems for widespread use of e-notice.88
II. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF SERVICE
The Pennoyer/Mullane paradigm idealizes notice that is service on natural
persons and that is service made by a discrete and identifiable natural person.
Placing natural persons at the center of service and notice has complicated
efforts to adapt to the social, economic, and technological changes of the late
twentieth and early twenty-first century. Most methods of service and notice,
as well as the evaluation of their adequacy, use natural persons as the
benchmark. Every form of service that is not delivered by or to a natural person
is scrutinized for how well it mimics the natural person ideal, or by how far it
strays from that model.
87. See Paul Croke, Unpredictable Future: Computer Technology Growing Faster as Time Passes, BALT.
POST-EXAM’R (Jan. 27, 2015), https://baltimorepostexaminer.com/unpredictable-future-computertechnology-growing-faster-time-passes/2015/01/27 [https://perma.cc/Q6QM-2ZEM].
88. Connecticut courts offer various electronic services, such as electronic filing and online
attorney registration. See Welcome to State of Connecticut Judicial Branch E-Services, CONN. JUD.
BRANCH (2017), https://www.jud.ct.gov/external/super/E-Services/efile/ [https://perma.cc/NYM2B8Z8]. In Maryland, the Maryland Electronic Courts (MDEC) project will create a single judiciarywide integrated case management system that will be used by all the courts in the Maryland state court
system. Baltimore County Courts Launch Electronic Case Management System, MD. CTS. (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://www.mdcourts.gov/media/news/2019/pr20190222 [https://perma.cc/483C-ENGV]. To date,
more than 87% of Maryland’s jurisdictions are operating under MDEC with the goal of bringing
MDEC to all Maryland state courts by 2021. Id. E-filing is mandatory for attorneys in Maryland
counties that have implemented the MDEC case management system. Id. Indiana’s statewide e-filing
system is used to file documents online in nearly all types of cases in the state’s trial and appellate
courts. See E-FINE INDIANA, E-FILING USER GUIDE: INDIANA STATEWIDE E-FILING SYSTEM 10,
https://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/efiling-user-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9L3-5JRB] (last updated
May 13, 2021). Indiana’s system allows litigants to electronically serve anyone on the Public Service
List, or, in existing cases, a person listed as a service contact in the e-filing system. Id. If neither of
those apply, litigants must serve conventionally. Id.
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Although it once might have seemed that the most trustworthy form of
notice or service of process was to demand that notice was delivered by one
natural person to another natural person, the modern circumstances of notice
demand a reevaluation of both premises. Nonetheless, some of the problems
with centering natural persons long predate the modern era. No one questioned
the assumptions about the superiority of natural persons because the
alternatives to service by and on natural persons were so poor by comparison.
The transmission of notice by a natural person to a natural person has a
long history dating back to the capias ad respondendum in which the sheriff would
arrest the defendant and hold him until trial.89 Once service of process replaced
the capias and forms of substituted service soon emerged, the implicit hierarchy
of acceptable methods of notice reflected how closely such processes involved
natural persons. Table 1, below, demonstrates how notice can be categorized
along two axes of involvement by natural persons.
Table 1. Matrix of Notice Categorized by Natural and Non-Natural
Persons

Notice Received by a Natural
Person
-

Notice Not
Received by a
Natural Person

-

Notice Served by a Natural
Person
In-hand notice to
defendant/named party
In-hand substituted
service on household
member; business officer;
or designated agent for
service of process
Notice affixed to property
Other forms of
conspicuous service

Notice Not Served by
a Natural Person
- Notice mailed or
emailed90 to
individuals

-

Notice by
publication
New publication
notice methods
such as targeted
advertising

Observe how methods in which a natural person receives notice are
preferred by both lawmakers and courts. The procedures in the lower right
quadrant are methods of last resort or reserved for “exceptional” circumstances
or “nontraditional” forms of litigation (such as class actions) and must usually
89. This also had important jurisdictional implications. See Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and
Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 32.
90. See infra Section II.B. Some of the skepticism for this method can be attributed to the
hesitancy to accept intangible communications as process.
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be paired with a method of direct notice.91 It has taken a global pandemic and
near universal disruption of ordinary court proceedings for some courts to begin
questioning the need or even desirability of face-to-face interaction in the
service of process.92
The rules and the implicit hierarchy reflect three competing
considerations: cost, feasibility, and reliability. Along the reliability axis, it has
gone mostly unquestioned that human-to-human transmission is the most
reliable form of notice. Process or other notices that were published in
newspapers, nailed to property, or affixed to a public place (perhaps a town hall)
could be lost, destroyed, or simply never seen by the intended recipient. The
most certain way to ensure receipt was to have one natural person attest to the
fact that they had personally delivered the notice to the adverse party.
But even the earlier, “simpler” days of litigation could not support a rigid
rule in which only in-hand, personal service was effective as notice. This is
because such a demand would quickly outstrip the realities of cost and
feasibility. Consider cost. If a plaintiff dispatched a process server to the house
of the defendant, only to find that the defendant was absent, it would quickly
become expensive to demand that the process server spend additional time
locating the defendant (even when the defendant could be easily found) when
process could just as well be left with a trustworthy member of the defendant’s
household.93 And consider feasibility: courts and lawmakers have long
recognized that some defendants are difficult to find and that, under some
circumstances, this logistical difficulty should not bar plaintiffs from
vindicating their rights in court.94
91. In the case of affixing notice to property, most jurisdictions require that notice also be mailed
to the “last known address.” See infra note 121. In the case of class actions or other complex cases, notice
by publication is almost always paired with direct notice to known class members. See Bartholomew,
supra note 13, at 223 n.31.
92. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Motion for Substituted Service, OHVA, Inc. v. Ace Merch. Processing,
LLC, No. 4:20-cv-1244-KPE (S.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2020) (making a motion for substantiated service due
to the COVID lockdown).
93. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(B); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308 (McKinney 2021); ALASKA R. CIV.
P. 4(d)(1) (stating that service is acceptable on a natural person “by leaving [the summons and
complaint] at the individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein”); OHIO R. CIV. P. 4.1(c) (“[P]rocess may be delivered by . . .
leaving a copy . . . at the usual place of residence of the person to be served with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein.”).
94. See, e.g., SEC v. Reynolds, 112 F.3d 505, No. 96-6073, 1996 WL 599797, at *2–3 (2d Cir.
1996) (unpublished table decision) (holding that the SEC was entitled to their default judgment against
the appellee because they showed due diligence in trying to serve him and the defendant was knowingly
avoiding service); Hunt v. Inter-Globe Energy, Inc., 770 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(holding that the plaintiff exercised due diligence in attempting to serve the defendant, as they
complied with Oklahoma law with regard to service by publication, and therefore the default judgment
was valid); JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Baldi, 10 N.Y.S.3d 126, 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (holding
that the plaintiff exercised due diligence in attempting to make service on the defendant before
resorting to “affix and mail” service, and therefore the default judgment was affirmed); Barlage v.
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These assumptions formed the basis of the Pennoyer/Mullane hierarchy.
Reliability of receipt was the dominant concern but could be tempered by the
competing demands of cost and feasibility of service. The following two
sections will demonstrate that the circumstances of modern life, commerce, and
litigation have changed such that courts and lawmakers should reevaluate the
core assumptions of the Pennoyer/Mullane model regarding the role of natural
persons. Notice that does not require a natural person for delivery or even
receipt may be more reliable than it once was. And an honest evaluation of the
use of natural persons in transmitting and receiving notice illuminates the less
desirable aspects of the reliance on the use of natural persons. Accordingly, this
part begins with an argument for increased trust in notice practices that do not
depend on direct receipt (notice by publication) or personal delivery (mail and
electronic transmission), and then examines the ways in which misplaced trust
in the reliability of natural persons has enabled systemic problems in notice and
service of process.
A.

Reevaluating the Role of Natural Persons in the Delivery and Receipt of Notice

The Pennoyer/Mullane model of notice and service of process assumes the
superiority of using natural persons to deliver and receive notice. This was a
perfectly logical assumption. If one wanted to be sure that an adverse party
actually received notice or process, then the best solution was for one natural
person to affirm that they had hand delivered the documents to that person, or
to another natural person whom one could reasonably assume would then
transmit the documents to the defendant.
Because delivery to a natural person went unquestioned as the most
reliable means of notice, the acceptability of every other means of notice was
evaluated based on how closely it hewed to this ideal. Accordingly, the next best
solution was to have the defendant (perhaps a natural person, perhaps a business
or entity), designate an agent for receipt of service.95 Also acceptable was service
on trustworthy natural persons in close relational proximity to the defendant,
thus spawning the familiar rules of substituted service on a person of suitable
age and discretion at the defendant’s household or serving a business by
delivering the relevant documents to an office or other like person.96 All of these
methods of substituted service involved significant interaction with a natural
person. Other forms of substituted service were disfavored or cast as methods
of last resort.

Valentine, 110 P.3d 371, 379 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a default judgment was valid because
the plaintiff satisfied due diligence in serving the defendant).
95. See infra notes 132–46 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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The modern circumstances of notice call those assumptions into question.
Many of the vulnerabilities and disadvantages of centering natural persons were
always present. However, it is only in the modern era of equally effective, if not
more reliable methods of service that the drawbacks to privileging service on
natural persons become visible. Before delving into the ways in which
overreliance on the natural person paradigm has stunted innovation in the use
of non-natural persons and systems, it is worth briefly interrogating the
assumed superiority of natural persons as servers or receivers of process and
notice.
Given its relatively stable and successful operation, service of process on
natural persons in “ordinary” lawsuits rarely results in problems that make
headlines. The natural person paradigm places outsized trust in constructive
notice where a natural person is the recipient (and also possibly the server) of
notice. But not all defendants are comfortably situated in a way that renders
them ready to receive service of process and absorb its consequences. For such
defendants, constructive notice is deemed sufficient.97 These parties are left
vulnerable to the consequences of failure to receive actual notice, the worst of
which is the entry of a default judgment.98
Defendants who do not speak or read English are at a disadvantage when
it comes to understanding the content and import of a summons and
complaint.99 Beyond issues of comprehension, there are defendants whose
concerns about immigration status cause them to avoid entanglements with the
civil litigation system.100 This may interfere with the willingness to accept
97. Constructive notice is “information or knowledge of a fact imputed by law to a person . . .
because he or she could have discovered the fact by proper diligence, and his or her situation was such
as to cast upon him or her the duty of inquiring into it.” ROMUALDO P. ECLAVEA, 58 AM. JUR. § 4
(2d ed. 2021); see also Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 24 (1928) (holding that notice rules must
“indicate that there is reasonable probability that if the statutes are complied with, the defendant will
receive actual notice”).
98. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 55 (grounds for default judgment); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3215 (McKinney
2021) (grounds for default judgment).
99. See Lysette P. Romero, Note, Why English-Only Notice to Spanish-Only Speakers Is Not Enough:
The Argument for Enhancing Procedural Due Process in New Mexico, 41 N.M. L. REV. 603, 603–04 (2011).
This problem is clearly not confined to non-native speakers of English. The comprehensibility of legal
documents to lay persons (and, frankly, even members of the legal profession) is a serious issue. This
Article focuses on the problems inherent in the mechanics of notice and service of process, but the
contents of notice itself is also a constitutional due process issue and one in need of its own deeper
investigation. See Todd B. Hilsee, Shannon R. Wheatman & Gina M. Intrepido, Do You Really Want
Me To Know My Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process in Class Action Notice Is More Than Just Plain
Language: A Desire to Actually Inform, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1359, 1365–66 (2005); Howard M.
Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective
Representation, 2003 U. CHI. L.F. 519, 555 (describing the Federal Judicial Center’s efforts to “improve
the readability of class action notices by designing notices using plain language”).
100. See Saja Hindi, ICE Arrests at Colorado Courthouses Leave Immigrants Fearful, DENVER POST
(Jan. 20, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2020/01/20/ice-immigrant-arrests-coloradocourthouses/ [https://perma.cc/2S4S-MKY5 (dark archive)]; Christina Goldbaum, When Paying a
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service of process because of a fear of interacting with someone associated with
the court system.
Some defendants, particularly those in marginalized communities, are
victims of so-called “sewer service.101 Although there is no foolproof rule for
service of process that could ever eliminate such shenanigans entirely, it is
certainly possible to identify and target communities where this practice is
widespread and engage in efforts to mitigate the problem.102
Service antics can also be costly for plaintiffs. Evasion of service is the
defendant’s analogue to plaintiffs who weaponize sewer service. When service
of process rules center natural persons and make service by mail or other
impersonal means subject to affirmative agreement or waiver, a well-situated
defendant can run up the costs of litigation for the defendant. In a recent highprofile incident, Rudy Giuliani spent a week evading process servers in the post2020 election fraud libel lawsuits.103 By making himself, his close associates, and
the premises of his residence and office inaccessible, he forced the plaintiffs to
expend extra effort and expense104 to serve him in the lawsuit. By privileging
natural persons as the ideal servers and recipients of process, the current system

Traffic
Ticket
Can
End
in
Deportation,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
30,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/30/nyregion/ice-courthouse-arrests.html [https://perma.cc/UK9C
-2EZ5 (dark archive)]. Note that the immigration system itself is a site of problematic notice practices.
Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D Manta, (Un)Civil Denaturalization, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 402, 405–
06 (2019).
101. See Gottshall, supra note 12, at 816–18; Ray Rivera, Suit Claims Fraud by New York Debt
Collectors, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/nyregion/31debt.html
[https://perma.cc/DN6C-2JMA (dark archive)]; Bernice Yeung, Bay Area Residents Sue Process Servers
for Failing to Deliver Lawsuits, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (May 24, 2012, 12:00 AM),
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-bay-area-residents-sue-process-servers-for-failing2012may24-htmlstory.html#:~:text=The%20lawsuits%20accuse%20ABC%20Legal,also%20named%
20in%20these%20lawsuits.%20 [https://perma.cc/QQM6-3Y6N (dark archive)]; Claudia Wilner,
Senior Staff Att’y, Neighborhood Econ. Dev. Advoc. Project, Comments at the Fed. Trade Comm’n
Roundtable, Debt Collection: Protecting Consumers (Jan. 8, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/public_comments/protecting-consumers-debt-collection-litigation-and-arbitrationseries-roundtable-discussions-august/545921-00022.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S8J-2BQR] (“In New York
City, the default judgment rate is approximately 75% and the answer rate hovers around 10%. We
believe that sewer service . . . is the primary reason that most defendants do not appear in court.”).
102. See infra Part IV.
103. See Stephen Rex Brown, Rudy Giuliani Tried Dodging Getting Served with $1B Dominion Voting
Systems Suit: Source, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 22, 2021, 7:53 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/ny-giuliani-dominion-lawsuit-service-20210222-6ejrl7c3rva3xbvhzqijoloe3y-story.html
[https://perma.cc/8H8Y-MRJ6] (describing prolonged efforts to find and serve Giuliani in the
Dominion voting libel lawsuit).
104. The expense component is complicated. A failure to waive formal service in federal court
without good cause will result in the defendant bearing the costs of service. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2).
As a practical matter, however, evasion of service, even if unjustified, forces plaintiffs to make an upfront investment in a process server, seek the remedy of service costs, and then attempt to collect such
fees from a party who has already demonstrated intransigence. One can only imagine that some
plaintiffs are deterred from attempting formal service and thus pursuing their lawsuit.
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allows a defendant evading service to disingenuously make himself unavailable
or unreachable via impersonal means.
Excessive costs and logistical feasibility are not the only downsides to
relying on natural persons for notice. While natural persons should always
continue to be a supported option for the delivery and receipt of notice,
lawmakers and courts should not let the historical superiority of relying on
natural persons cloud the ability to interrogate and remedy some of the pitfalls
of assuming that service by or on natural persons is generally unproblematic.
With those observations in mind, it is time to investigate how the
Pennoyer/Mullane “natural person” paradigm is responsible for the sluggish pace
of courts and lawmakers to adapt to and adopt new technologies for notice and
service of process.
B.

Impersonal Delivery: From the Old Circumstances of Service by Mail to the
New Circumstances of Electronic Communications

The oldest method of notice and the “poster child” for serving process was
the process server who could personally deliver the summons and provide an
attestation or affirmation of completion.105 Most other forms of notice required
direct action by an identifiable natural person. For example, the person
deputized to affix notice or attach property was a known and identifiable
actor.106 Prior to rules authorizing some form of notice by mail, notice was not
105. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(A); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(1) (McKinney 2021); 231 PA. CODE
§ 402(a)(1) (2021) (“[O]riginal process may be served by handing a copy to the defendant.”); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.10 (Westlaw current with urgency legislation through Ch. 145 of 2021 Reg.
Sess.) (“[S]ummons maybe served by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and of the complaint
to the person to be served.”).
106. Most allow service on a party at a place that they may routinely be found, such as their home
or place of business. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(2) (McKinney 1994) (authorizing service at the “actual
place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode of the person to be served”); 231 PA. CODE
§ 402(a)(2)(iii) (2021) (“[P]rocess may be served by handing a copy at any office or usual place of
business.”); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.20(a) (Westlaw current with urgency legislation through
Ch. 145 of 2021 Reg. Sess.) (authorizing service at a person’s office). However, the summons and
complaint must be left with someone of “suitable age and discretion.” ALASKA R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)
(authorizing service acceptable on a natural person “by leaving [the summons and complaint] at the
individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein”); OHIO R. CIV. P. 4.1(c) (“[P]rocess may be delivered by . . . leaving a copy . . .
at the usual place of residence of the person to be served with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein.”). Additionally, in some jurisdictions, this method of service is ineffective unless
the summons and complaint are also mailed to the party by first-class mail. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.
4; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(2) (McKinney 2021) (requiring service on a person of suitable age and discretion
followed up by first-class mail); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.20(a) (Westlaw current with urgency
legislation through Ch. 145 of 2021 Reg. Sess.) (requiring service on a party at a place that they are
routinely found to be accompanied by “mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class
mail . . . to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left”);
MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(c) (explaining how service of process can be completed and the circumstances in
which service by first-class mail is allowable).
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delivered through an intermediary system, save for notice by publication, the
special case of which is discussed below.
Although Mullane supposedly ushered in a new era of flexibility in
evaluating notice and service methods, it did little to disrupt the older
conceptual hierarchy. This was because, outside of notice by publication, notice
by mail was the only viable way of using a delivery system instead of an
identifiable human to deliver notice to intended recipients. Mullane gave
explicit due process imprimatur to notice by mail in the context of a form of
litigation that was visibly exceptional.107 The need to notify innumerable
recipients—some of whose identities were unknown—in a single action
necessitated that the Court authorize an impersonal means of notice. So, while
the Court articulated the flexible standard in order to accommodate a notice
plan in which only the known beneficiaries received notice by mail,108 it was
clear that the “circumstances” of the Mullane accounting action were quite
different from ordinary litigation.
Outside of complex litigation, notice by impersonal delivery (that is to
say, notice by mail) was not the site of investment, improvement, or innovation
in notice and service practices. Instead, notice by mail languished as a disfavored
alternative, useful mostly to savvy litigants who were already well-situated to
transmit, receive, and process the documents initiating litigation.
Utilizing an established, nationwide system of mail delivery is much
cheaper than deploying a dedicated process server, even when accounting for
conscientious use of certified or registered mail with the inclusion of prepaid
return postage. However, mail provides fewer outward indicia of receipt by the
relevant party than in-hand. Consequently, almost every jurisdiction requires
that service by mail include a form indicating receipt and a prepaid means of
returning it,109 or that the plaintiff use certified or registered mail to procure
proof that the notice was sent.110
With the gnawing intuition of the riskiness of relying on a system rather
than a person to deliver notice, most jurisdictions do not encourage service by
mail, and many caution litigants to consider whether it is worth the risk at all.111
107. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319–20 (1950) (considering
notice in a lawsuit involving a statutory accounting of a trust with many known and unknown resident
and nonresident beneficiaries).
108. The notice plan also stipulated publication in a periodical for successive weeks. Id. at 309–10.
109. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 312-a (McKinney 2021).
110. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 106(a)(2).
111. For example, California’s public-facing website cautions litigants that “[m]ail service is easy
but not very reliable because the court cannot know for sure that someone received the paperwork.”
Service of Court Papers, CAL. CTS.: JUD. BRANCH OF CAL., https://www.courts.ca.gov/selfhelpserving.htm [https://perma.cc/G488-FWAR]. In another example, New York’s public-facing
courts website only describes in-hand service, conspicuous delivery, and substituted service.
How Legal Papers Are Delivered (Service), NYCOURTS.GOV, https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/
goingtocourt/service.shtml [https://perma.cc/295B-AHKR] (last updated Nov. 26, 2019).
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not independently authorize service
by mail,112 instead they denominate it as a mail-based waiver process. Rule 4 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had formerly referred to this process as
“service by mail,” but the rules drafters changed the language to reflect the fact
that this method requires active participation by the defendant rather than
passive reception.113 In practice, it resembles the procedures that many states
label “service by mail” or “personal service by mail,” all of which require the
defendant to return an acknowledgment (or, in jurisdictions that follow the new
Rule 4, a waiver) within a certain period of time,114 although some defendants
retain the right to traditional service of process.115
Although these rules are designed to insulate most plaintiffs from the
additional costs or difficulties with statutes of limitations if service by mail (or
waiver request) is not acknowledged, jurisdictions do not promote service by
mail as a reliable or cost-effective means of commencing a lawsuit. New York
State, for example, authorizes service by mail in section 312-a of the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules, but the public-facing website does not mention
service by mail at all as a possibility. Instead, it informs potential litigants that
their three options for service of a summons and complaint are personal
delivery, substituted delivery,116 or conspicuous delivery.117 California, on the
other hand, does list “service by mail” as an acceptable means of service of
process on its public-facing webpage. But it cautions potential litigants: “Mail
service is easy but not very reliable because the court cannot know for sure that
someone received the paperwork.”118
Using the mail to commence a lawsuit is authorized in many U.S.
jurisdictions.119 But jurisdictions make its disfavored status clear or shift the
language away from service and notice altogether. Jurisdictions have crafted
service by mail and waiver of service rules to try to leverage the substantial cost
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4. However, service by mail is still permissible if one is serving pursuant
to state law. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1).
113. Cf. Gulley v. Mayo Found., 886 F.2d 161, 165–66 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a signature is
not sufficient evidence to acknowledge receipt of a summons and complaint and that the formal
requirements of mail service are not met unless an acknowledgement form is returned to the sender).
114. In the federal system, failure by certain types of defendants to waive service results in the
defendant bearing the cost of traditional service. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2); see also CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 415.30(d) (Westlaw current with urgency legislation through Ch. 145 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1) (requiring individuals, corporations, and associations—but not other
types of defendants, like governments—to request a waiver).
116. Substituted delivery requires that the plaintiff mail the papers in addition to delivery, but the
website does not direct plaintiffs to any options in which delivery by mail is sufficient without also
serving papers personally, conspicuously, or leaving them with someone else. How Legal Papers Are
Delivered (Service), supra note 111.
117. Id.
118. Service of Court Papers, supra note 111.
119. See 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 195, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2021) (describing service
by mail generally).
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savings of serving an adverse party by mail while simultaneously ensuring that
lost, misdirected, or unopened mail does not unfairly burden the defendant with
a default judgment or the plaintiff with the inability to move forward with a
lawsuit.
The skepticism about the reliability of service by mail is not unfounded.120
There are defendants who have unstable residential status or lack a permanent
fixed address altogether.121 A recent study of suspended driver’s license notices
in North Carolina demonstrates that as many as one-third of mailed notices of
driver’s license suspensions do not reach the intended recipient, and that the
problems with reaching individuals at a listed residential address stem from a
wide variety of problems.122 Medicaid caseworkers report boxes of returned mail
lining a wall of an El Paso, Texas, office, indicia that persons in need are not
receiving necessary notices of their government benefits.123 Incarcerated
persons are at the mercy of prison mail delivery systems which, as Justice
Ginsburg observed in her Dusenbery v. United States124 dissent, may be seriously
suboptimal.125

120. See Garrett et al., supra note 17, at 185.
121. Robin Phinney, Exploring Residential Mobility Among Low-Income Families, 87 SOC. SERV.
REV. 780, 780 (2013) (“[I]t is widely recognized that low-income households move more frequently.”);
see also Budzinski, supra note 9, at 169–70 (“Because current methods of service all center around a
defendant’s home address or physical location, pro se litigants in low-income communities often
struggle to accomplish traditional service on defendants who do not have a stable or identifiable home
or work address.”). For these defendants, leaving a summons and complaint with a person of suitable
age and discretion at a “last known address” may be just as ineffective as service by mail. See Robertson
& Manta, supra note 100, at 414–17 (2019) (describing the plight of a person who was deported in
absentia because notice of his immigration hearing was served at his “friend’s house” and he never
received it).
122. Garrett et al., supra note 17, at 191. These problems included “insufficient address; not
deliverable as addressed; attempted to forward but forwarded address not known; unclaimed; no street
or number exists at address; no mail receptacle; time to forward to a new address expired; vacant; wrong
address in handwriting; moved and no forwarding; undeliverable as addressed; refused.” Id.
123. Markian Hawryluk, Return to Sender? Just One Missed Letter Can Be Enough to End
Medicaid Benefits, NPR (Nov. 1, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2019/11/01/774804485/return-to-sender-just-one-missed-letter-can-be-enough-to-end-medicaidbenefits?utm_campaign=storyshare&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_medium=social [https://perma.cc
/4KQ2-L4H5]. Correctly identifying people and where they can be reached can make a tangible
difference. A report by the Treasury Department found that people who received a notice that they
had recently paid a fine for lacking insurance coverage under the Affordable Care Act were more likely
to sign up for insurance. Sarah Kliff, The I.R.S. Sent a Letter to 3.9 Million People It Saved Some of Their
Lives, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/10/upshot/irs-letter-healthinsurance-fine-study.html [https://perma.cc/U99T-D9XV (dark archive)] (last updated Dec. 13, 2019).
Economists calculated that these plain notices, sent by first-class mail, may have saved up to 700 lives.
Id.
124. 534 U.S. 161 (2002).
125. Id. at 179–80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As Professor Shapiro observed, Justice Ginsburg
“argued forcefully that the procedures followed (and since improved) were too lax given the
government’s total control of the inmate’s location and the feasibility of better procedures.” David L.
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Thus, a system that relies blithely on the efficacy of mail would be
problematic. But what is curious is the startling lack of innovation in notice for
ordinary lawsuits. Society has changed significantly since the days of hand
delivery of important messages, face-to-face communications, and reliance on
mail and the postal service as a delivery system for written communication. Yet
when commencing a lawsuit, these are still the primary options. The urgency
of accommodating large scale communication needs has pushed class action
notice further into the realm of e-notice, but even here, society and technology
have far outpaced litigation rules and practices.
This Article has already shown the extent to which a fierce commitment
to the process-as-paper model has hindered the development of e-notice
systems in ordinary litigation. One can now also see how skepticism about using
systems instead of persons to deliver notice have further stymied such efforts.
Mail was the default system of impersonal delivery at the time of Mullane.
Viewed with mild distrust and disfavor, the question was whether the
circumstances of a particular lawsuit warranted its use.126 In Mullane, the
Supreme Court, starting from the unstated assumption that personal service to
the trust beneficiaries would be impracticable, appeared to trust that the high
number of known recipients would blunt possible problems with mail delivery,
as well as protect the interests of the unknown beneficiaries.127 In the case of
service by mail or waiver rules, lawmakers ensured that impersonal service
would be reasonable under the assumed circumstances that impersonal delivery
could only be so reliable.
While this might have been a fair assessment of the circumstances of the
mid-twentieth century, it is time to reassess the circumstances of
communication and delivery. Jurisdictions could be much more proactive and
creative about enabling and creating systems for impersonal delivery that
capture the cost-savings and efficiencies of service by mail without falling prey
to its reliability deficits.
As it stands, the most outwardly innovative changes still operate within
the invisible circumstances of the Pennoyer/Mullane model. Texas’s new rules
for service of process are illustrative. The Lone Star State recently garnered
attention for amendments to its procedural rules that would permit service of
process via “social media, email, or other technology.”128 While this rule looks

Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg’s First Decade: Some Thoughts About Her Contributions in the Fields of Procedure
and Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 26 (2004).
126. See Hendershot v. Ferkel, 56 N.E.2d 205, 207 (Ohio 1944) (discussing the circumstances
under which service by mail was authorized by a mid-century Ohio statute); Van Aernam v. Winslow,
35 N.W. 381, 381 (Minn. 1887) (describing and approving of the nineteenth-century Minnesota statute
that provided for service by mail under certain circumstances).
127. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319–20 (1950).
128. TEX. R. CIV. P. 106(b)(2).
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innovative, it is questionable just how far this rule will go in enabling routine
use of e-notice or establishing a workable e-notice system. The Texas rule
codifies notice practices that judges have approved on an ad hoc basis in many
jurisdictions across the country; when a judge does authorize some form of
email or social media service, it is in exceptional circumstances when other
forms of service have failed.129 The Texas rule mimics this structure. It does not
authorize e-service as a matter of course, on par with personal service or service
by mail. Instead, in order to use e-service, the plaintiff must make a motion to
do so and must demonstrate that they have attempted and failed to serve the
defendant in person or by mail.130
This is far from the type of innovative solution that would befit the new
circumstances of notice. It authorizes selective use of e-notice without building
a system or designing a set of protocols that would harness the advantages of
electronic communication while minimizing its downsides. It also reinforces the
implicit Pennoyer/Mullane hierarchy which privileges in-person delivery or hard
copy documents, followed closely by mail delivery. It is unclear what benefit
the Texas rulemakers believe flows from continuing to prioritize mail over
electronic communication. As this Article has already established, mail delivery
is less reliable than rulemakers might want to admit. And service by mail in
Texas does not even require return confirmation from the recipient—proof that
notice has been sent via certified or registered mail is enough.131 One wonders
how this is any different than notice sent to an email address or social media
account that the plaintiff has a good faith reason to believe is valid. And yet,
the image of a natural person grasping a physical piece of paper is a powerful
enough image that Texas has amended its rules without truly grasping how the
new circumstances of communication are not those of old.
E-notice is not a simple or all-encompassing answer to the problems of
improving impersonal delivery. For one thing, electronic communications have
a different set of trustworthiness and reliability problems that rule makers must
account for, a point which is returned to in Section II.D. Additionally,
electronic impersonal delivery systems must account for the sector of the
129. See, e.g., Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 714–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (concluding,
after considering several other methods of service, that “plaintiff has a compelling reason to make
Facebook the sole, rather than the supplemental means of service, with the court satisfied that it is a
method reasonably calculated to give defendant notice that he is being sued for divorce”); Rio Props.,
Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Despite our endorsement of service
of process by email in this case, we are cognizant of its limitations.”). But see Johnson v. Preleski, 229
A.3d 97, 116–17 (Conn. 2020) (holding that electronic service is not permitted unless specifically
authorized under the procedural rules by state legislature).
130. TEX. R. CIV. P. 106(b).
131. TEX. R. CIV. P. 106(a)(2) (“[M]ailing to the defendant by registered or certified mail, return
receipt requested, a copy of the citation and of the petition.”). A return receipt is issued by the postal
service and shows a signature on receipt of delivery. See Insurance & Extra Services, U.S. POSTAL SERV.,
https://www.usps.com/ship/insurance-extra-services.htm [https://perma.cc/3SVA-ZJCJ].
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populace who are not (yet) well-situated to receive and process e-notice. As
with any complex problem, there are myriad options for designing and
executing a system or the rules to support it. But the one thing unifying most
systems right now is the near total lack of innovation or design in that space.
While e-filing, e-discovery, and even e-court appearances have grown up
around it, the supposedly flexible Mullane standard has anchored notice in the
mostly analog work of the mid-twentieth century.
None of this is to say that personal service is irrelevant or unneeded. There
will always be situations in which personal service is the only (or clearly
superior) way of reaching an adverse party. To advocate decentering natural
persons is not to discard their role in service altogether. Rather, it is to erase
the shadow that they have cast across conceptual understandings of the
boundaries of what notice is and can be.
C.

Impersonal Receipt: The New Circumstances for the Old Problem of Serving
Businesses

Although nonnatural persons (businesses and other organizations and
entities)132 have been parties to lawsuits since before the founding,133 the notice
rules in most jurisdictions continue to require that natural persons receive
process on behalf of businesses whenever possible. These rules, with very few
exceptions, favor arrangements in which a natural person is interposed to
receive notice on behalf of the business, either because they are an officer or
manager of the business,134 or because they have been appointed as agent for
receiving service of process. The result is that, in an era of lightning-fast ecommerce and easy electronic communication, serving businesses is still an
expensive and labor-intensive process.
Service on businesses relies, in part, on a registered agent model in which
businesses’ commercial registered agents serve as their agent for receiving

132. For ease of reading, this Article uses “businesses” as a shorthand for all non-natural persons,
even though many organizations and entities that are parties to lawsuits are not businesses, per se.
133. For an excellent history of corporate and other non-natural entities, including the rights to
sue and be sued, see ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES
WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 46–51 (2018).
134. Businesses can be served “directly” by “delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to
an officer, a managing or general agent.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(1)(B); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 416.10(b) (Westlaw current with urgency legislation through Ch. 145 of 2021 Reg. Sess.) (“A
summons may be served on a corporation by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint . . .
[t]o the president, chief executive officer, or other head of the corporation, a vice president, a secretary
or assistant secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a controller or chief financial officer, a general
manager, or a person authorized by the corporation to receive service of process.”).
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service of process.135 While this was once “an ingenious and elegant solution”136
to the problem of serving businesses whose precise whereabouts and leadership
are not always obvious to plaintiffs, this system is still “a manual undertaking
that is susceptible to failure at each step, including human error on the part of
its employees.”137 Beyond the periodic problems that result from the logistical
failures of registered agents, it is unclear that the costs of maintaining such a
system are justified. At least one commentator has called the cost-benefit
calculus of this system into question and estimated that in the United States,
“total yearly registered-agent fees likely well exceed a quarter-billion dollars.”138
The pricey commercial registered agent method cannot exist without its
reliance on corporate registration statutes. In these situations, out-of-state
corporations must designate a state’s secretary of state as its agent for service of
process as a condition of an admission to do business in the state.139 Like the
failures of notice that flow from the use of commercial agents, service on the
secretary of state does not always result in actual notice to a business entity.140
Yet, the Supreme Court has upheld this service as constitutionally acceptable
constructive notice.141 As Professor Chatman has argued, this produces a
situation in which out-of-state corporations are in a constitutionally worse
position than natural persons142 (whom we might recall are also often victims of
poor notice practices), and the procedures that states have constructed “impose
unduly burdensome restrictions which may reward [a] bad-actor plaintiff.”143
While corporations are often in a better position than natural persons to stop
or counteract the consequences of bad notice by virtue of greater financial
resources and established relationship with lawyers, the additional procedural
wrangling adds complexity and expense to the process. This warrants further
analysis to determine whether these procedures could be reimagined to reflect
a fairer allocation of the costs and risks of notice between the parties, thus
enhancing access to justice for all parties involved.

135. See Jennings, supra note 14, at 79–80 (describing the registered agent model and process for
service on business entities).
136. Id. at 77. Professor Jennings argues that this leads to a “residual uncertainty in the case of
artificial persons” and asks, “how can it be known whether papers have found their way to the
appropriate legal decision-maker?” Id. at 80–81.
137. Id. at 87.
138. Id. at 84.
139. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 306(b), 1301 (McKinney 2021).
140. See Chatman, supra note 14, at 52–55 (detailing the failures of notice that occur when
secretaries cannot reach a defendant corporation).
141. Id. at 62–63 (“Such treatment seems particularly outdated in the modern context of multistate and multi-national corporations.”).
142. Id. at 62 (arguing that this treatment is no longer constitutionally justified after Citizens
United).
143. Id. at 79.
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The working assumption appears to be that this multimillion-dollar
commercial agent enterprise and the registration statute system form the
inevitable background cost of providing a constitutionally acceptable system for
notice and service of process. It is time to question whether the current rules
and practices do much more than line the pockets of a few commercial
registration agencies who provide a mostly (but not completely) competent
service that could be accomplished by far more efficient and even effective
means.144 Professor Jennings has proposed a system and model statutes that
allow businesses to bypass the registered agent model in favor of e-service, a
method that could result in significant economic efficiencies as well as the
minimization of human error.145
The need for lawmakers and courts to innovate e-service options is not
limited to the business context, but the analysis shows the multiple layers of
assumptions that must be cast aside. Promoting e-service on businesses is not
just about questioning the registered agent model.146 Rather, it is a matter of
letting go of the implicit need to center natural persons as either means of
delivery or the target of receipt of process and discarding the old process-aspaper model of notice.
D.

The Special Problem of Notice by Publication

Notice by publication is a form of “substituted service” and is considered
to be one of the least desirable forms thereof. Historically, notice by publication
acted as a stopgap measure, designed to aid plaintiffs who would otherwise be
unable to bring lawsuits against defendants who could not be found and served
by other means.147
144. See Jennings, supra note 14, at 76–77 (suggesting a system of electronic registered agency for
businesses).
145. Id.
146. The registered agent model might also serve as a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over
a defendant. The status of general or specific jurisdiction via an appointed agent in the forum state is
the subject of contested judicial and scholarly debate. See, e.g., Jack B. Harrison, Registration, Fairness,
and General Jurisdiction, 95 NEB. L. REV. 477, 481 (2016) (arguing that “consistent with the Court’s
opinion in Burnham, where a corporation’s statutorily appointed agent is properly served within a state,
that state may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over that corporation”); Tanya J. Monestier,
Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1358–71
(2015) (discussing the issues inherent in using registered agents for acquiring general or specific
jurisdiction); Patrick Woolley, Rediscovering the Limited Role of the Federal Rules in Regulating Personal
Jurisdiction, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 565 passim (2019) (describing the delicate interplay between agency,
service of process, and personal jurisdiction).
147. A typical notice by publication statute reads:
Whenever, in any action affecting property or status within the jurisdiction of the court . . .
plaintiff or his or her attorney shall file, at the office of the clerk of the court in which the
action is pending, an affidavit showing that the defendant resides or has gone out of this State,
or on due inquiry cannot be found, or is concealed within this State, so that process cannot be
served upon him or her, and stating the place of residence of the defendant, if known, or that
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One method of notice by publication involved leveraging the tool of in
rem jurisdiction. In these cases, courts deemed notice by publication sufficient
under a caretaker theory of property in which the property owner had a duty to
keep apprised of any proceedings against the property.148 In in personam cases,
states typically authorized notice by publication when the defendant could not
be found or served after a good faith effort.149 A typical statute would mandate
publication of the notice in a relevant newspaper or periodical for a number of
weeks.150
The skepticism toward notice by publication is easy to understand. First,
it only results in actual notice if the relevant party happens upon the publication
and reads the notice. This evokes the image of Neff, the original defendant in
Pennoyer, residing in some unnamed part of California, and unlikely to ever
purchase or read the Pacific Christian Advocate (the newspaper in which the
lawsuit notice was published pursuant to Oregon’s long-arm statute).151 This
was the reality for most litigants until recently. If the only notice of a
proceeding appeared in a publication, the defendant had to be lucky enough to
read the right publication on the right day or week, and to comb through the
numerous legal notices printed in miniscule font printed deep inside the
publication.
Although publication notice was far from ideal, a few tools existed to blunt
its harshness. Wealthy parties or businesses with retained counsel could rely on
lawyers or other professionals who dutifully read the legal notices and kept them
apprised of any pending actions of interest. Most jurisdictions that permitted
notice by publication required repeated publication for a successive number of
weeks which would, at least in theory, raise the likelihood that the target of the
notice would happen upon the right publication at the right time, or specified
upon diligent inquiry his or her place of residence cannot be ascertained, the clerk shall cause
publication to be made in some newspaper published in the county in which the action is
pending. If there is no newspaper published in that county, then the publication shall be in a
newspaper published in an adjoining county in this State, having a circulation in the county
in which action is pending. . . . The clerk shall also, within 10 days of the first publication of
the notice, send a copy thereof by mail, addressed to each defendant whose place of residence
is stated . . . .
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-206(a) (Westlaw through the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 101st Gen. Assemb.).
148. See, e.g., N. Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925) (“Owners of real estate
may so order their affairs that they may be informed of . . . [the] proceedings of which there is
published notice, and the law may be framed in recognition of that fact.”); Longyear v. Toolan, 209
U.S. 414, 418 (1908) (holding that in a tax condemnation proceeding, a party is “entitled to . . .
sufficient notice. It is no objection that the notice was only by publication”).
149. 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1074 n.20 (4th ed. 2021).
150. 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3047 (3d ed. 2021).
151. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 717 (1877).

99 N.C. L. REV. 1521 (2021)

1556

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

that the notice be published in a periodical that the relevant defendant was
somewhat likely to read.152 But other problems were harder to mitigate with
legislative solutions. For example, printing notices that contained more
information and were printed in a larger and more conspicuous font would have
been expensive and unwieldy for the party giving notice and for the publication
that served as the medium through which notice was conveyed.153 To have
mandated this legislatively would have radically altered the size and
manageability of the publications where such notices were printed.
This was the picture of notice by publication at the time of Mullane.
Understandably, it was hard for courts to endorse such a weak and mostly
ineffective method of service. Nevertheless, notice by publication was tolerated
as the best available alternative to dismissing a lawsuit when a defendant or
absent party could not (intentionally or unintentionally) be served by the more
traditional methods.
However, the circumstances of publication have changed. Publication no
longer hinges on the fortuity of the right party having access to a particular
tangible periodical at the right moment. The availability of publishing and
publicizing information over the internet and via electronic means has
152. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (“It is not an accident
that the greater number of cases reaching this Court on the question of adequacy of notice have been
concerned with actions founded on process constructively served through local newspapers. Chance
alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back
pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper’s normal circulation
the odds that the information will never reach him are large indeed. The chance of actual notice is
further reduced when, as here, the notice required does not even name those whose attention it is
supposed to attract and does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention. In weighing its
sufficiency on the basis of equivalence with actual notice, we are unable to regard this as more than a
feint.”); 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1786 (3d ed. 2021) (discussing the various requirements for notice in newspapers for
class action, which center on the idea of ensuring people actually see the notice); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R.
316(a) (McKinney 2021) (noting that a requirement of notice by newspaper in New York is that the
notice is published once a week for four consecutive weeks).
153. See, e.g., John L. C. Black & Michael A. Wineburg, Publication of Legal Notices in New York:
Guidelines for a Revision, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 144 (1969) (discussing the costs of print notices);
Joe Friedrichs, Rates Soar, Issues Surface with Legal Notices in Local Newspaper, BOREAL (Jan. 13, 2019,
7:51 PM), https://www.boreal.org/2019/01/13/187369/rates-soar-issues-surface-with-legal-notices-inlocal-newspaper [https://perma.cc/Z6DA-S9YQ] (discussing the increasing rates that newspapers
charge for public legal notices); Dave McKinley, You Paid for It: The High Cost of Fine Print, NBC
WGRZ (May 4, 2018, 6:06 PM), https://www.wgrz.com/article/news/local/you-paid-for-it-the-highcost-of-fine-print/71-548946170 [https://perma.cc/7P7N-PDLN] (last updated May 4, 2018, 6:15 PM)
(“In a just released report, Mychajliw’s office found that Erie County alone spent $800,000 in the last
five years to publish legal ads, which perhaps ranks with junk mail in terms of reader interest.”);
Maryanne Reed, Fighting To Keep Public Notices in Newspapers, NIEMANREPORTS (Jan. 3, 2019),
https://niemanreports.org/articles/fighting-to-keep-public-notices-in-newspapers/ [https://perma.cc/
BA38-8HXK] (“In recent years, some cash-strapped state legislatures have tried to remove the
requirement that public notices be published in newspapers, opting instead to allow government
entities to post them for free on their own websites.”).
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revolutionized how people receive and consume news and information.
Moreover, the circumstances of “a publication” itself have changed.
Whereas it was once easy to identify a newspaper, magazine, or other
printed periodical for what it was, people now interact with social media sites,
RSS feeds, and other platforms which themselves might not be traditional
“publications,”154 but are the primary vehicles for driving consumer desire and
attention towards particular sites and news articles of interest. A legal notice no
longer needs to be printed in a tiny font and an obscure location because
cyberspace eliminates the space and printing constraint of traditional print
media.
As a result, there are some situations, particularly those connected to
notice in complex litigation, in which notice by publication is superior to older
methods of individual notice, even including electronically delivered individual
notice.155 The new technologies of predictive algorithms and targeted
advertising might be better at reaching a high percentage of putative class
members than merely relying on lists of possible class members generated from
warranty or credit card use databases.156
Even without the explicit use of targeted advertising technology, the
internet news and social media ecosystem can be a powerful vehicle for notice.157
Consider what happened with the Equifax data breach litigation in 2019. In
September of 2017, the credit monitoring data giant Equifax made an
astonishing admission to the public; its security systems had been breached, and
the sensitive personal data of over 147 million consumers was now potentially
in the hands of hackers.158 As expected after such an event, lawsuits quickly
154. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1) (“The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive
computer services available to individual Americans represents an extraordinary advance in the
availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens.”); Anupam Chander, How Law
Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 652 (2014) (explaining that courts read § 230 and “interactive
computer service” broadly); see also Philip P. Ehrlich, A Balancing Equation for Social Media Publication
Notice, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 2163, 2164–66 (2016) (detailing how the use of social media for service
“raise questions about how courts do and should weigh the costs of over- and underinclusive FRCP 23
publication notice, creating uncertainty for litigants who propose novel notice plans and for courts
faced with new technologies”).
155. The question of serving individual notice utilizing electronic means is addressed below. See
infra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
156. See Aiken, supra note 74, at 992 (explaining that targeted electronically published notice
“allows parties to harness large amounts of information about potential class members to discern where
they are likely to see notice, and post such notice accordingly”); Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 257–58
(describing possibilities for hypertargeting in electronically published notice); Rose, supra note 13, at
526–27 (suggesting an alternative to Aiken’s algorithm model in which a government registry database
mediates targeted content and generates notices and lists of potential class members).
157. See Scheibel, supra note 79, at 1359 (“Use of the internet and mobile devices generates large
amounts of data that could be exploited for notice and allow information about class actions to reach
the right people.”).
158. For a summary of the facts behind the Equifax breach, see Equifax Data Breach, ELEC. PRIV.
INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/data-breach/equifax/ [https://perma.cc/QUZ4-M84X].
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followed. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), forty-eight states, and a class of affected
consumers all brought actions that were consolidated before Judge Thrash in
the Northern District of Georgia.159 In July of 2019, the parties reached a global
settlement of around $650 million.160 A portion of the proposed settlement
consisted of fines paid to the FTC and CFPB, and some covered attorney’s fees.
The compensation for consumers consisted of three options: (1) free credit
monitoring for a number of years through Equifax or one of its competitors; (2)
a cash payment of up to $125; or (3) other sums of money available to claimants
who could document specific losses stemming from the data breach.
On July 22, 2019, the parties announced the details of the proposed
settlement and the plaintiffs moved the court to direct notice to class members.
Major news outlets reported on the details of the settlement that day. Then on
July 26 at 12:27 PM, Slate published an article, You Have a Moral Obligation To
Claim Your $125 from Equifax.161 Later that afternoon at 4:21 PM, CNBC
columnist Dan Mangan posted his column, I May Have Banked up to $125 by
Filling Out this Equifax Claim in Seconds—What Are You Waiting For?162 Then, at
4:35 PM, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the freshman congressional representative
with a substantial national reputation and extensive social media following,
tweeted out the following missive to her nearly five million followers:
“Everyone: go get your check from Equifax! $125 is a nice chunk of change. Get
that money and pay off a bill, sock it away, take a day off, treat yourself,
whatever you’d like - but cash that check! It takes one minute. Do it here.”163
She included a link to the third-party settlement administrator and a link
to the CNBC article. Within just a few hours, the story went viral. Numerous
people retweeted the CNBC and Slate articles or posted them on other social
media sites, including Facebook and Instagram.164
159. See generally In re Equifax, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 3d 1295 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (hearing the
consolidated cases from the Equifax data breach).
160. See generally Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement, Certifying Settlement Class, and
Awarding Attorney’s Fees, Expenses, and Service Awards, 362 F. Supp. 3d 1295 (2020) (No. 1:17-md02800-TWT) (granting approval of the final settlement in the Equifax data breach claim); see also Lily
Hay Newman, $700 Million Equifax Fine Is Still Too Little, Too Late, WIRED (July 22, 2019, 3:58 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-fine-not-enough/ [https://perma.cc/A2NM-L6S4].
161. Josephine Wolff, You Have a Moral Obligation To Claim Your $125 from Equifax, SLATE
(July 26, 2019, 12:27 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/07/equifax-settlement-money-how-toclaim.html [https://perma.cc/HPF6-9BH5].
162. Dan Mangan, I May Have Banked up to $125 by Filling Out this Equifax Claim in Seconds—
What Are You Waiting For?, CNBC (July 26, 2019, 4:21 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/26/youcould-make-125-by-filling-out-this-equifax-data-breach-claim-form.html?__source=twitter%7Cmain
[https://perma.cc/MLL3-4CY6] (last updated July 30, 2019, 9:46 AM).
163. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), TWITTER (July 26, 2019, 4:35 PM), https://twitter.com/
AOC /status/115485268152309350 [https://perma.cc/E92A-ED66].
164. Analytics for the Slate article can be found at the following website: Lookup
Social Share Counts for Slate Article, SHAREAHOLIC, https://www.sharescore.com/?url=https://
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Consumers began filling out claim forms that evening, creating panic
among the parties who had negotiated the settlement. No one had banked on
high participation rates, and the prospect of many of the 147 million consumers
filing claims for the cash payment threatened to drive the compensation amount
down to just a few cents per consumer.165 By 10:04 PM that evening, OcasioCortez tweeted: “Okay everyone UPDATE on Equifax: for most people the
better deal is 10 years of free credit monitoring. There’s apparently a run on
settlements so there’s anxiety people are going to get 16 cent checks. But if you
choose 10 years of credit monitoring, Equifax *must* cover it.”166
Since then, consumers have continued to file claims with the settlement
administrator, but the fate of the overall settlement remains unclear.167 As of
early 2020, only about ten percent of affected consumers had filed claims.168
Still, that number was sufficiently high that the cash option is predicted to pay
out only about $7 per person—a far cry from the original $125 announced in the
proposed settlement.169 What happened that day was remarkable, but also
should have been predictable. A few provocative articles and well-placed tweets
achieved in one day what statutory and constitutional notice fail to accomplish
over the life of a class action: they conveyed to affected consumers information
about the pendency of a lawsuit and instructions about how to participate in the
settlement.170
slate.com/technology/2019/07/equifax-settlement-money-how-to-claim.html [https://perma.cc/295BAHKR]. Analytics for the CNBC article can be found at the following website: Lookup
Social Share Courts for CNBC Article, SHAREAHOLIC, https://www.sharescore.com/?url=https://www.
cnbc.com/2019/07/26/you-could-make-125-by-filling-out-this-equifax-data-breach-claim-form.html
[https:// perma.cc/MW44-UA6S].
165. See Jon Levine, Sorry AOC, but Equifax Probably Won’t Be Paying People $125 Apiece, N.Y. POST
(July 27, 2019, 11:28 AM), https://nypost.com/2019/07/27/sorry-aoc-but-equifax-probably-wont-bepaying-people-125-apiece/ [https://perma.cc/5GYK-DPZ3]; Shahar Ziv, Here’s Why You Could Get as
Little as $0.21 from Equifax’s Data Breach Settlement, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2019, 7:15 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/shaharziv/2019/08/01/you-might-only-get-21-cents-from-the-equifaxdata-breach-settlement-instead-of-125/#39307cec4cbe [https://perma.cc/72KJ-U5WJ (dark archive)].
166. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), TWITTER (July 26, 2019, 10:04 PM),
https://twitter.com/AOC /status/1154935657527222272 [https://perma.cc/RNQ3-34EP].
167. See Kelly Tyko, Consumers Must Deal with More Red Tape to Get Cash from Equifax Settlement,
USA TODAY (Sept. 10, 2019, 3:33 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/09/10/equifaxdata-breach-settlement-new-step-added-get-cash/2276645001/ [https://perma.cc/XLD5-7ZG6] (last
updated Sept. 10, 2019, 4:54 PM) (noting that in order to be considered for a settlement check from
Equifax, a consumer must: (1) verify enrollment in a credit monitoring service by October 15 and (2)
follow further steps detailed in an email from Equifax).
168. Tara Siegel Bernard, Equifax Breach Affected 147 Million, but Most Sit Out
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/business/equifaxbreach-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/LZU4-AENS (dark archive)].
169. Id.
170. See Alison Frankel, More than 900 Equifax Class Members Have Filed Objections to Settlement –
Class Action Inc, REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2019, 3:45 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otcequifax/more-than-900-equifax-class-members-have-filed-objections-to-settlement-class-action-incidUSKBN1XZ2E3 [https://perma.cc/9FXY-P29W] (discussing the 900 members of the class action
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This startling notice story reveals that, in many mass actions, the parties
on all sides of the action were banking on low class participation rates. This was
a completely reasonable assumption—class participation rates are abysmally
low, especially in consumer class actions.171 The Equifax settlement lays bare
how deeply connected class compensation is to notice. Once news of the
Equifax settlement went viral and steps for filing a claim were clearly
communicated, consumers flocked to the settlement site. This challenges a
growing narrative that class participation rates are not really “that bad,”172 or
that low rates exist because consumers do not really care about corporate
misconduct, or perhaps consumers are just lazy.173 But more importantly, the
Equifax story poses a stark contrast between the ordinary “best practices” of
notice and the realities of how people actually learn of a pending action.
The Equifax story was one of unintentional viral notice. Thus, it is
unsurprising that once the initial news story passed, claims dropped back to
lower rates when email messages were the main vector of notice. One wonders
what a more sustained “viral publication” approach might have garnered.
Hyper-targeted e-notice can provide potential class members with the
repeated exposure to notice that successive weekly publication in paper
periodicals never could. Notice by publication should no longer be considered
inferior, simply by virtue of the fact that it is impersonalized and calls back to
the previously ineffective notice by publication. That does not mean, however,
that notice by publication should sit atop a new hierarchy (particularly for class
actions), or that it is otherwise superior or easy to execute. The new frontier of

who are objecting over the fairness of the settlement, given that Equifax had such sensitive information
from their users); Peter Hayes, Equifax Data Breach Settlement Approval to be Challenged,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 11, 2020, 3:48 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/equifax-databreach-settlement-approval-to-be-challenged [https://perma.cc/RXE3-LBZA (dark archive)]
(noting that the official complaint and challenge to the Equifax settlement will be heard by
the Eleventh Circuit) For the final settlement details, see Peter Hayes, Equifax to Pay
$380.5 Million to Settle Data Breach Class Claims, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 14, 2020, 9:11 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/equifax-to-pay-380-5-million-to-settle-data-breach-classclaims [https://perma.cc/KS3K-VMXG (dark archive)].
171. See Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 248 n.171 (“Customer class actions generate some of the
lowest claims rates.”); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Paradox of Access Justice, and Its Application to Mandatory
Arbitration, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1755, 1810 (2016) (discussing low participation rates in settlements with
boilerplate notices); Alison Frankel, FTC’s Comprehensive Study Finds Median Consumer Class Action
Claims Rate Is 9%, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2019, 6:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otcclaimsrate/ftcs-comprehensive-study-finds-median-consumer-class-action-claims-rate-is-9idUSKCN1VV2QU [https://perma.cc/H5GT-UGTM] (“[A]fter collating data on 149 consumer class
actions from seven different claims administrators: The median claims rate in these cases is 9%.").
172. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Robert C. Gilbert, An Empirical Look at Compensation in Consumer
Class Actions, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 767, 792 (2015) (“[W]e think our findings should lead to optimism
rather than pessimism about the compensatory potential of consumer class actions.”).
173. See Rose, supra note 13, at 498–99 (discussing the standard explanations for low class
participation rates).
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doctrinal and logistical questions for publication by e-notice have already been
ably discussed by Professors Bartholomew, Rose, and other commentators.174
The Pennoyer/Mullane model exerts considerable influence on how courts
and lawmakers confront the new dimensions of notice. The spirit of Mullane
appears to leave ample room for evaluating the costs and benefits of e-notice,
both as a general matter, and in the particular circumstances of a given action.
But the reality is that the invisible circumstances of the Pennoyer/Mullane
framework leave judges evaluating the “costs” of notice against a benchmark of
the dollar amount of assembling databases, printing notices, and mailing them.
Thus, it is no surprise that district judges have been uncertain about how
to integrate an entirely new dimension “cost” into the calculus—namely, the
question of whether electronic publication notice might be “too good,” causing
the court or the parties to lose control over the content and dissemination of
notice. As Professor Bartholomew has documented, judges have responded in
various ways to defendants’ claims that notice by electronic publication might
damage the defendant’s reputation175 or become a tool for internet fraudsters
and scammers.176 These are serious concerns that should not be brushed off as
inconsequential, nor seen as insurmountable roadblocks to effective publication
by notice.
What is lacking in this discussion is a fresh constitutional and subconstitutional framework within which courts can evaluate and balance these
concerns within the “reasonable under the circumstances” rubric. So long as
courts, lawmakers, litigants, and commentators are explicitly or implicitly tying
their expectations of circumstances and reasonableness to the printed and
mailed notices of the pre-internet era, these questions will only be tentatively
resolved in fits and starts. The broader consideration of how the benefits, costs,
and circumstances of notice by publication should be evaluated in the digital
age will remain unresolved.
III. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LITIGATION
Just as modern litigation notice doctrine is shaped by the invisible
circumstances of service and the invisible circumstances of process, it is also
shaped by a set of normative assumptions regarding a model of “typical”
174. Id. at 487; Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 217; Aiken, supra note 74, at 967 (2017); Scheibel,
supra note 79, at 1331.
175. See Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 251–52 (“[A] distorted understanding of this tailoring
requirement leads some courts to forgo E-Notice.”).
176. See id. at 242–43 (quoting and discussing fears of alteration and fraudulent reproduction of enotice); see, e.g., Kuznyetsov v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc., No. 09-CV-379, 2009 WL
1515175, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 1, 2009) (worrying that “electronic communication inherently has the
potential to be copied and forwarded to other people via the internet with commentary that could
distort the notice approved by the Court.” (quoting Reab v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 214 F.R.D. 623, 630–31
(D. Colo. 2002))).
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litigation against which variants are evaluated. Unlike service and process,
where Mullane did not really shift the underlying norms of notice, Mullane did
account for some genuine changes in the norms of litigation in the decades since
Pennoyer. Along with International Shoe, it solidified interstate disputes (and the
accompanying need for broader service and personal jurisdiction rules) as
routine.177 And while Pennoyer arose from a lawsuit with the simple structure of
one plaintiff, one defendant, and one claim, Mullane arose out of an equitable
accounting action that, with its numerous known and unknown absent-party
beneficiaries, resembles much of modern complex litigation.178 Despite this
expansion image of “litigation,” Mullane still entrenched some aspects of the
older picture of litigation. The lingering concept of what litigation “really is”
continues to constrain ideas for what notice and service can and should be.
A.

Complex Litigation Is Litigation

Complex litigation, the field of litigation that concerns large, multiparty
(and usually multiclaim) lawsuits, differs from “traditional” litigation on
numerous dimensions. It is sensible that lawyers, academics, and even judges
specialize in the area so they can best handle and understand the unique features
of complex litigation. The proliferation of mass litigation, particularly outside
of class actions in the form of multidistrict litigation and other forms of
consolidation has prompted debates regarding whether and to what extent
complex procedural forms should be governed by a set of different procedural
rules.179
Class action notice is its own cottage industry, with specialized rules in
federal and state courts and a bevy of third-party providers who design and
administer notice plans.180 There is nothing wrong with treating class action
notice as a separate category in need of its own rules and practices, even to the

177. See Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 48 (describing
Mullane and International Shoe as a joint turning point in the ability to litigate cases across state lines).
178. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 307–09 (1950) (describing the
common trust accounting action).
179. There has been considerable discussion and debate amongst scholars about the endless stream
of complex paperwork and forms that are considered the norm for large, complex litigation in federal
courts. See generally, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nudges and Norms in Multidistrict Litigation: A
Response to Engstrom, 129 YALE L.J. F. 64, 64–66 (2019) (discussing how all of the procedures and
paperwork for modern litigation not found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure negatively impact
plaintiffs of all sizes); Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2, 10–12 (2019)
(discussing how courts should scale back the complex procedural devices found in multidistrict
litigation in order to benefit the federal judicial system and litigants).
180. For an overview of class action notice practices and procedures, see generally WILLIAM B.
RUBERSTEIN, 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:12 (5th ed. 2020) (outlining certification notice
content); Klonoff et al., supra note 51, at 729–31 (focusing “on the capacity of the internet to foster true
participation by absent class members”).

99 N.C. L. REV. 1521 (2021)

2021]

THE INVISIBLE CIRCUMSTANCES OF NOTICE

1563

extent that the current class action notice landscape does not harness the power
of modern technological tools.181
The problem stems from treating complex litigation as an exception
insofar as it is a deviation from an imagined “norm” of litigation; a norm that
sets the benchmark for typical and against which all perceived deviations must
be judged. Complex litigation exceptionalism has had two consequences for the
conceptual development of notice doctrine: first, that class action notices should
closely resemble the forms used for traditional service of process; and second,
that the different forms of notice that necessarily evolved for use in complex
litigation do not and cannot inform notice and service rules in so-called
“traditional” litigation.
This Article has already demonstrated much of the first point in Section
I.B. The Pennoyer/Mullane model of notice largely equated notice with paper
documents that required physical transmission to a (preferably known and
identifiable) recipient. This invisible circumstance is at least partially to blame
for the suspicion surrounding e-notice and the skepticism of viewing notice by
publication as a presumptively acceptable method of service in class and mass
actions. When class actions are viewed as exceptional rather than just different,
notice practices have never fully been evaluated on their own terms. Even with
scant references to actual service of process practices in noncomplex cases, the
invisible circumstances of what “typical” litigation is looms large and acts as the
lens through which almost all class action notice practices are judged. Thus,
complex litigation should be recognized as one category of litigation, rather than
as “exceptional” and defined by its deviations from a perceived litigation norm.
This would liberate lawmakers to truly look at class action (and other complex
litigation) notice on its own terms, without a benchmark reference to other
forms of litigation.
This recognition would also allow lawmakers to view class action notice
practices as equally valid, and thus presumptively instructive to the
promulgation and evaluation of notice and service procedures in other types of
litigation. E-notice and notice by publication could assume a far greater role in
notice and service of process in ordinary actions. Comfort with the use of these
tools in class actions stemmed from the necessity of using exceptional methods
to serve notice in “exceptional” forms of litigation because the traditional tools
of notice and service were either logistically impossible or prohibitively
expensive. The common forms of substituted service in class actions (first-class
mail or postcards, e-notice, and notice by publication) lashed to the
exceptionalist mast of complex litigation. Then, once the form of litigation and
form of notice were so bound, few lawmakers or commentators have paused to
181. See Klonoff et al., supra note 51, at 731–34 (discussing the inadequacy of traditional methods
of notice for class actions due to changes in technology).
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evaluate the merits of these forms of substituted service in their own right,
discounting the possibility that such tools might be used in noncomplex cases.
If the invisible circumstances of notice are neutralized, it becomes more
plausible to formalize the use of e-notice or even notice by publication in
ordinary litigation.
B.

Litigation in an Era of Contracts of Adhesion

Another changed circumstance of litigation is the extent to which pre-suit
agreements, particularly contracts of adhesion,182 have shaped the litigation
options for parties to consumer, commercial, and employment contracts.
Mullane, decided in 1950, came from a time when courts and commentators
were just emerging from the era of the ouster doctrine in which most efforts to
alter the rules of jurisdiction of a public tribunal were considered
unenforceable.183 The Supreme Court’s approval of forum selection clauses,
arbitration clauses, and other contractual provisions altering procedural rules
and rights in commercial transactions postdate Mullane by a few decades.184 The
boom in the use of such clauses can be attributed to the ubiquity of boilerplate
contracts in consumer and commercial life.
While many of these devices (especially arbitration clauses) have been the
target of extensive scholarly commentary, contractual provisions that alter
notice have gone almost entirely unremarked upon. This silence continues
against a three-decade backdrop of a marked increase in default judgments in
state court, and a recent uptick in the use of waivers of notice to allow creditors
to bypass adversarial proceedings and obtain quick default judgments.185 The
trend of contract procedure is a significant change in the circumstances of
litigation since Mullane. Its effect has blurred the distinction between
182. Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J.
REGUL. 313, 346 (2011) (“A ‘contract of adhesion,’ in the parlance of contract law, is a take-it-or-leaveit standard form agreement, usually presented to a consumer by a business entity.”).
183. See Robin J Effron, Ousted: The New Dynamics of Privatized Procedure and Judicial Discretion,
98 B.U. L. REV. 127, 134 (2018) [hereinafter Effron, Ousted] (describing the older form of ouster
doctrine under which parties could not make agreements with a jurisdictional selections clause that
would “oust” an otherwise proper court of its power).
184. The Supreme Court approved of forum selection clauses in federal cases in federal court.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587–88, 596–97 (1991) (examining forum selection
clauses in consumer contracts of adhesion); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2, 15 (1972)
(considering forum selection clauses in commercial, arms-length transactions). The Court also
authorized confession-of-judgment clauses in D.H. Overmyer Co. of Ohio v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 182–
83, 187 (1972).
185. See Zachary R. Mider & Zeke Faux, “I Hereby Confess Judgement”: How
an Obscure Legal Document Turned New York’s Court System into a Debt-Collection
Machine That’s Chewing Up Small Businesses Across America,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-confessions-of-judgment/ [https://perma
.cc/DH3U-MLLD (dark archive)] (describing the increase in default judgments and notice waivers as
a method for obtaining quick judgments).

99 N.C. L. REV. 1521 (2021)

2021]

THE INVISIBLE CIRCUMSTANCES OF NOTICE

1565

procedural events that happen within litigation and procedural events that
precede litigation. But contracts of adhesion have chipped away at notice, and it
is time to reevaluate whether this question should be folded back into the
Mullane due process inquiry.
Confession-of-judgment clauses (also known as “cognovit notes”) are a fast
track to default judgments, which are the worst-case result of bad or deficient
notice in adversarial litigation.186 The specter of a binding and enforceable
judgment entered against a party without their participation or even knowledge
has driven the discourse of notice as an instrumental right.187 A judgment
entered against a party who does not appear in an action is a drastic remedy,
but one that has long been accepted as a fair result when the no-show party
seems to have knowingly and voluntarily made the choice not to appear in the
action.188
The procedures for obtaining a default judgment reflect a balancing act.
The magnitude and finality of the judgment convey the seriousness with which
the judicial system expects parties to take the pendency of a lawsuit. But all
states and the federal system have statutes and procedures for setting aside a
default judgment.189 In addition to a few hard-and-fast rules,190 these procedures
amount to a tangle of standards permitting judges to use their discretion to set
aside a default judgment when the defaulting party can provide some sort of
reasonable explanation for their failure to appear or participate.191 This state of
affairs is used to justify the network of rules and practices in which constructive
186. See D.H. Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 176 (“The cognovit is the ancient legal device by which
the debtor consents in advance to the holder’s obtaining a judgment without notice or hearing, and
possibly even with the appearance, on the debtor’s behalf, of an attorney designated by the holder.”).
187. See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 406 (1855) (describing that the ability to
participate in proceedings is a “principle of natural justice which requires a person to have notice of a
suit before he can be conclusively bound by its result”).
188. See generally, e.g., Sindhi v. Raina, 905 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that the default
judgment entered against defendant was not an abuse of discretion because the defendant ignored
several district court warnings and orders); Prime Rate Premium Fin. Corp. v. Larson, 930 F.3d 759
(6th Cir. 2019) (holding that the default judgment entered against defendant did not violate her due
process or notice rights); Bookman v. 816 Belmont Realty, LLC, 121 N.Y.S.3d 134 (N.Y. App. Div.
2020) (holding that property owner’s failure to keep secretary of state apprised of current address over
significant period of time did not constitute a reasonable excuse for its default that would entitle
property owner to vacatur of default judgment).
189. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5015(a) (McKinney 2021) (listing grounds for relief from judgment);
WISC. STAT. ANN. § 806.07(1) (Westlaw through 2021 Act 19) (listing grounds for relief from
judgment).
190. For example, a showing of defective or improper service of the motion “deprives the court of
jurisdiction to entertain the motion . . . and any default judgment procured in the absence of valid
service is a nullity.” Adames v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 126 A.D.2d 462, 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
(citation omitted). A showing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the parties or action is another
straightforward rule for vacating a default judgment. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(4) (McKinney 2021).
191. For example, many states allow judges to set aside a default judgment in cases of “excusable
default.” See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(1) (McKinney 2021).
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notice is almost always constitutionally sufficient notice.192 It is a standard
which gives the plaintiff the structure and incentives to serve process in a way
that is “reasonably calculated” to reach the adversary and ensures that the
defendant is not incentivized to evade service in order to avoid legal
entanglements altogether.
The continued existence of default judgments, then, is not a per se failure
of constitutionally sufficient notice. Patterns of default judgments, however, are
a different story. They are a clue that constructive notice no longer reflects a
constitutionally appropriate allocation of the risks and burdens of notice and
service of process. However, more importantly, they are a symptom of rules
and practices that have dipped below Mullane’s aspiration: a notice standard
based on what steps are reasonable to apprise a party that an action against them
has been filed.
Cognovit notes, or “confession-of-judgment”193 clauses, are the canaries in
the default judgment coal mine. A cognovit note allows a creditor to obtain
summary judgment against the debtor in the event of default without serving
the defendant with notice of the pending action.194 Typically, the contract
contains a clause called a “warrant of attorney” in conspicuous typeface that
explains to the debtor that, by agreeing to the contract, the creditor may seek a
default judgment from the court without notice to the debtor or a court trial.195
When the debtor is (allegedly) in default, the creditor goes to court, complaint
and confession of judgment in hand, and obtains a default judgment that is now
fully enforceable in all jurisdictions under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.196
State and lower federal courts have limited the enforceability of
confession-of-judgment clauses, at least formally, to the commercial context,

192. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170–71 (2002) (explaining that the Court has
“never required actual notice” as a condition of meeting the Mullane standard).
193. “Cognovit” refers to “[a]n acknowledgment of debt or liability in the form of a confessed
judgment . . . in which the consumer relinquished, in advance, any right to be notified of court hearings
in any suit for nonpayment.” Cognovit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “Confession of
judgment is ‘[a] person’s agreeing to the entry of judgment upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of
an event, such as making a payment.’” Confession of Judgment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
194. Sutton Bank v. Progressive Polymers, LLC, 163 N.E.3d 546, 550–51 (Ohio 2020).
195. For example, Ohio’s Warrant of Attorney must read:
Warning—By signing this paper you give up your right to notice and court trial. If you do not
pay on time a court judgment may be taken against you without your prior knowledge and the
powers of a court can be used to collect from you regardless of any claims you may have against
the creditor whether for returned goods, faulty goods, failure on his part to comply with the
agreement, or any other cause.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.13(D) (Westlaw through Files 1 to 10 of the 134th Gen. Assemb.
(2021–22)).
196. See infra Appendix.
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and the Supreme Court in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. upheld197 accepted
the legality of these clauses in commercial, arms-length negotiated contracts.198
Even with use confined to commercial transactions, cognovit notes have
persisted and, in some states, their use has burgeoned in the past decade.199
Successful challenges to a default judgment entered pursuant to a confessionof-judgment clause are rare, their pursuit is expensive, and most defendants
only learn about the entry of the judgment when their assets have been frozen,
or their property has been seized pursuant to an enforcement action.200
Enforcement of confession-of-judgment clauses raise serious public policy
and due process concerns.201 Even when agreed upon between well-resourced
and sophisticated parties, the ability to obtain an enforceable money judgment
without even notifying one’s adversary is a serious proposition.202 For this
reason, some states completely prohibit the use of confession-of-judgment
clauses on the grounds that they violate public policy.203
Outside of total prohibition, there is a good deal of variation among the
states as to the legality and scope of such clauses. A majority of states permit
the use of cognovit clauses, some on more restrictive conditions than others.204
The restrictions mirror the larger policy concerns with cognovit clauses. States
that permit cognovit notes have procedures that require that the clause appear
“more clearly and conspicuously than anything else on the document,”205 or that

197. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
198. Id. at 187–88.
199. Mider & Faux, supra note 185.
200. Id.
201. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1020
(1959) (referring to the “vigor of the public policy [argument] against [confession of judgment]
agreements”); Hank Skelton, Note, POVERTY LAW—Judgment by Confession—Entry of Judgment by
Confession Without Notice of Hearing is a Violation of Due Process if the Warrant is Executed in a Consumer
Sales or Financing Transaction by a Maker Who Earns Less Than 10,000 Dollars a Year. Swarb v. Lennox,
—F. Supp.— (W. D. Pa. 1970), 49 TEX. L. REV. 169, 172–73 (1970) (“[J]udgment by confession is
objectionable not only because it fails to provide for notice and hearing, but also because it is perfectly
designed for harassment and intimidation.”).
202. See, e.g., Eric B. Smith, Comment, The Process Due upon Confession of Judgment in Pennsylvania
and § 1983 Liability upon the Private Attorney: A Proposed Solution, 100 DICKINSON L. REV. 991, 1000–
01 (1996); John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1969)
(“Perhaps confession of judgment clauses are so pernicious that they should be declared illegal.”).
203. ALA. CODE. § 8-9-11 (Westlaw through Act 2021-295); Wright v. Robinson, 468 So. 2d 94,
97 (Ala. 1985) (“[A]greements to confess judgment are void as against public policy.”).
204. See infra Appendix (grouping states into four categories: (1) states that do not enforce cognovit
clauses except via enforcing an out-of-state judgment via the Full Faith and Credit Clause; (2) states
that have remained silent on the matter; (3) states where clauses are enforced but with heightened
requirements; and (4) states where clauses are enforceable on similar terms to the Overmyer decision).
205. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2323.13(D) (Westlaw through Files 1 to 10 of the 134th Gen.
Assemb. (2021–2022)).
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the contract “indicate[s] conscious assent.”206 States enforce cognovit clauses
when there is a showing of consent, but the “showing must be clearer than that
necessary to sustain ordinary contract provisions.”207 Given, however, the very
low bar many courts have set for “consent” in ordinary contracts of adhesion,208
one wonders just how strictly courts scrutinize the use of such clauses. After all,
in most instances, the device itself prevents a real-time contestation of the
invocation of the clause. Ex post challenges are expensive and time-consuming,
particularly from the position of a debtor who may have already found herself
in challenging circumstances.209
Due process concerns lurk in the current commercial contract use of
cognovit clauses, and the specter of expansion into the personal and consumer
context should be a cause for high alert. The commercial/consumer barrier is
not always effective in protecting ordinary persons from the surprise and
devastation of the enforcement of a cognovit note. This occurs primarily in
states such as New York that take an open stance toward enforcement of
cognovit clauses, with little more than lip service paid to the sophisticated party
context that the Supreme Court approved in Overmyer.210 Clever use of choice
of law and forum clauses allow lenders to choose a forum in which the confession
is enforceable.211 And thanks to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution, only a few willing states are needed.212
New York, in particular, has come under scrutiny in the past decade for a
cottage industry that uses and enforces confession-of-judgment clauses.213
Lenders have moved beyond ordinary small business loans into a market of
206. Drew J. Gentsch & Danya M. Keller, The Use of Confession of Judgment Clauses Within Indemnity
Agreements, 2015 FID. & SUR. L. COMM. NEWSL. (A.B.A., Chicago, Ill.), Fall 2015, at *18 (citing
Pennsylvania cases that support heightened assent and writing requirements for cognovit clauses).
207. JRD, Inc. v. Edwards, 14 Pa. D & C. 4th 170, 173 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1992). In Pennsylvania, the
courts have characterized cognovit notes as “perhaps the most powerful and drastic document known
to civil law[,]” but the clauses are still enforceable. Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 97 A.2d 234, 236 (Pa.
1953).
208. See Uri Benoliel & Shmuel I. Becher, The Duty to Read the Unreadable, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 2255,
2260 (2019) (“[A] party is normally bound by the terms of the contract notwithstanding its failure to
read them.”).
209. Mider & Faux, supra note 185 (reporting that “[b]orrowers rarely try” to get a judgment
entered pursuant to a confession clause overturned and that the few borrowers who try almost always
fail, thus leading some lawyers to counsel their clients not to even bother contesting the judgment).
210. Gentsch & Keller, supra note 206, at 18.
211. Mider & Faux, supra note 185 (finding that, for example, “[i]n one month, a single clerk’s
office in Orange County, New York, issued 176 [cognovit] judgments against small businesses in 38
states and Puerto Rico.”).
212. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, all states must enforce the valid
judgments of other states, regardless of whether the enforcing state has the same laws. U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1. Thus, a state that does not directly enforce a confession of judgment clause would recognize
the valid judgment of another state (like New York) that does.
213. Confession of judgment clauses are enforceable in New York state. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3218(b)
(McKinney 2021).
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“merchant cash advances,”214 a lending market that bears a troubling
resemblance to the payday loan industry—a market already considered
predatory in an environment without the accompanying procedural device of the
cognovit clause.
While the cognovit notes are issued in transactions that are technically
commercial and to parties that are nominally “businesses,” the reality is that a
large number of these contracts are signed by relatively unsophisticated people
who operate small businesses or sole proprietorships. A blistering 2018
Bloomberg Businessweek report and data analysis documented the rise in the
use of cognovit notes in the years after the 2008 Great Recession and the havoc
that it has wreaked on small business owners.215 Comparing lenders who use
cognovit clauses to old-school mafia loan sharks who “have co-opted New York’s
court system and turned it into a high-speed debt-collection machine,”216 the
report documents instances of outright forgery in some of the signed
confessions that the creditors filed as judgments with the courts.217 Many other
legitimate documents led to asset seizures and bankruptcies that the debtors did
not fully understand and were generally unable to challenge, even though they
might have had legitimate defenses.218
The ease with which operators in states like New York have harnessed
cognovit notes demands a serious and nationwide reevaluation of the due
process status of confession-of-judgment clauses. The Mider and Faux report
led to bipartisan congressional interest in passing a proposed Small Business
Lending Fairness Act to curb the enforceability of confession-of-judgment
clauses, but the sponsors have been unable to generate sufficient support to pass
the bill.219 The New York State legislature passed a bill that prohibits the
enforcement of confession-of-judgment clauses against out-of-state residents
and mandates that actions must be brought in the county in which the defendant
resides.220 While this dampens the ability of New York based lenders to run a
nationwide confession-of-judgment default-judgment mill out of New York
state, it does nothing to protect non-consumer borrowers residing within New
York’s borders.
Although limiting the enforcement of confession-of-judgment clauses to
sophisticated parties has some conceptual appeal, one can sense a background
hum of general unease connected to the idea of relinquishing the right to future
214. Mider & Faux, supra note 185 (showing that in 2014, only a handful of cognovit judgments
were entered in New York State, but by 2018, judgments topped over 3,500 per quarter).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See S. 1961, 116th Cong. (2019).
220. S. 6395, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., 2019 N.Y. Laws 1106–07 (codified as amended at N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 3218(b) (McKinney 2021)).
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notice that one’s adversary has commenced a lawsuit. But even assuming that
sophisticated parties can sign away their due process rights of notice, one should
be concerned about the ability to ensure that confession-of-judgment clauses
really meet due process norms. As the New York example shows, using the
business/consumer distinction as a dividing line does little to protect ordinary
people from the direct effects of the enforcement of such clauses. The so-called
business debtors in New York are tantamount to consumers. This is not to say
that the proprietors of small businesses are helplessly inept or incompetent.
Rather, it is an acknowledgement that the sophistication needed to truly
understand and waive the right of notice is probably not the priority of a
business proprietor whose main focus is the substance of their business for
which they are seeking a loan. Given that bright-line rules that would purport
to separate businesses from consumers are a poor sorting mechanism for
sophistication, one wonders if there should be a more searching test to examine
whether the party who agrees to the cognovit note is truly in a position to make
a knowing and voluntary waiver. But such a procedure would still rely on postjudgment enforcement, a stage at which the debtor, now stripped of her assets,
is at a tremendous litigation disadvantage. Moreover, that sort of substantive
test would theoretically strip cognovit notes of their purported advantage—the
efficient administration of judgments without the messiness of litigation.
The Pennoyer/Mullane model has little to say about this phenomenon.
Mullane came at a time when contract procedure was in its infancy,221 and uses
of confession-of-judgment clauses were rare.222 Moreover, confession-ofjudgment clauses were not considered as much of a notice problem as they were
a contract problem.223 Conceptually, problems of notice belonged to lawsuits in
which notice would presumably not happen at all.
Confession-of-judgment clauses short-circuited this loop by cutting out
the notice question before a dispute even materialized. The Supreme Court in
D.H. Overmyer did not even cite Mullane. The pre-litigation question of whether
notice could be waived had little to do with the question of whether notice
during litigation was reasonably calculated under the circumstances. But the
modern circumstances of litigation should cause courts and lawmakers to
reevaluate this assumption. The widespread use of contract procedure means
that procedural questions are no longer limited to litigation itself. Due process
221. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 605, 611–15 (2010) (describing the history of contract procedure and noticing its ascendancy
in the second half of the twentieth century, particularly after 1980).
222. See Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation by the Norms Underlying
Civil Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 505–06 (2013) (“Confession of judgment clauses fell out of favor
for many years but may be enjoying something of a renaissance in some states.”).
223. Cf. id. at 475–85 (grouping confession of judgment clauses with other “contract procedures”
which are often analyzed as problems of consent and contract, rather than on their own procedural
terms).
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questions need to extend backward in time to account for the fact that the terms
of litigation are set before a dispute ever arises.
IV. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
The final invisible circumstance of notice is the idea of the circumstances
themselves. When Justice Jackson penned the phrase “notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances”224 he was almost certainly referring to
the circumstances of the litigation at hand and the parties thereto. The rules,
practices, and norms of notice and service of process are themselves
circumstances under which parties must execute and finance notice, but these
were all but invisible to the Supreme Court in 1950. The circumstances of notice
themselves appeared to be fixed, and it was the individual circumstances of the
parties that were variable. Although the rules for notice and service of process
grew and evolved with time, the deeper circumstances and assumptions
documented in this Article stood still as undisturbed benchmarks.
This Article has documented several assumptions about notice that should
be questioned or even discarded. These are the “invisible circumstances of
notice” that have prevented a supposedly flexible and adaptable standard from
evolving alongside twenty-first century changes in society, technology, and
communications. The way that courts and commentators have conceptualized
the “circumstances” under which notice is “reasonably calculated” has a
distinctive passive quality. The circumstances, usually described in the passive
voice, are a given and assumed set of background conditions. They predate the
dispute at hand and, in some ways, are seen to exist outside of the dispute
resolution system entirely. The financial and logistical circumstances may vary
among litigants and lawsuits, but large-scale changes in the circumstances of
notice have been integrated at a sluggish and timid pace by judges and
lawmakers.
Very little about the circumstances of notice, however, needs to be taken
as a given. Judges (and litigants, for that matter) tend to describe the
circumstances of notice as fixed; the judgment about what is reasonable is made
against the background of circumstances that seems to stand apart from the
court, the state, and the litigants. But this final “invisible circumstance,” like
those in the prior three parts of this Article, can change. It is time to reevaluate
the role of the state and courts as institutions that create and maintain the
circumstances of notice.
The development of the norms and practices of notice and service of
process over time have led to a state of affairs in which the state is both overand under-involved in these functions. In short, the state could play a bigger
role in the administration and execution of ordinary notice and service of
224. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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process. But when the state is involved, the extent to which these measures are
uncomfortably adjacent to law enforcement is a matter of some concern.
Clarifying the role of the state in creating the circumstances of notice can
remove many of the perceived obstructions in the path of innovative and costeffective changes to notice and service of process procedures.
A.

The State’s Role in the Circumstances of the Cost and Feasibility of Notice

In the earliest days of Anglo-American litigation, the state played a
maximalist role in notice and service of process, with a law enforcement official
arresting and serving the defendant.225 While that monopoly on forceful notice
disappeared before the founding, the state never fully relinquished its role in
providing state officials as process-servers for certain types of cases, or certain
classes of plaintiffs who are either presumed to need the assistance of the state
or can demonstrate that they are entitled to such help.226
In most ordinary cases, however, service of process is performed and
funded by the parties.227 Much like discovery in which the court oversees few
threshold matters and mostly adjudicates post hoc disputes, service is
accomplished without the involvement of the court or the state.228 In most runof-the-mill cases, the plaintiff is on their own to locate and serve the defendant.
In many instances, the ability to either serve or seek a waiver of service by mail
makes this process inexpensive and logistically easy.229 But in circumstances
where a defendant can be difficult to locate, is evading service, or is a type of
defendant who must be served personally, service can be expensive and
logistically difficult.230 Assistance from the court or the state only comes after
another logistical hurdle—asking the court for a necessary intervention.231 Even
in class actions, state involvement is minimal. Notice is almost always funded
and organized by the plaintiff class (who typically outsources this task to a thirdparty administrator).232 Although the judge may be involved in approving a
225. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878) (describing the limited situations in which
“[s]ubstituted service by publication, or in any other authorized form, may be sufficient”).
226. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3) (“At the plaintiff’s request, the court may order that service
be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed by the court.
The court must so order if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 or as a seaman under 28 U.S.C. § 1916.”).
227. See Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court, 128 YALE L.J. 1478, 1481–83 (2019)
(describing in forma pauperis assistance for service of process in federal court).
228. See id. at 1494.
229. David S. Welkowitz, The Trouble with Service by Mail, 67 NEB. L. REV. 289, 311 (1988).
230. See id. at 305–06.
231. See, e.g., LA. CODE. CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 5185 (2020) (“When an order of a court permits a
party to litigate without the payment of costs until this order is rescinded, he is entitled to . . . [a]ll
services required by law of a sheriff, clerk of court, court reporter, notary, or other public officer in, or
in connection with, the judicial proceeding, including, but not limited to, the filing of pleadings and
exhibits. . . .”).
232. 3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:27 (5th ed. 2020).
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notice plan,233 the execution of the plan is rarely the state or the court’s
responsibility.
Thus, when a judge encounters a question about “what notice would cost”
or “how difficult notice would be,” those issues do not arise in a vacuum. Many
of the background costs and logistical hurdles have already been set by the
extant norms and rules. Nothing about the due process right of notice and
opportunity to be heard specifies that the parties (particularly the plaintiff)
rather than the state must be responsible for funding and executing notice and
service of process. What would happen if the state proactively created the
circumstances of notice, rather than waiting to passively react to the
circumstances that arrived at the courthouse steps? In the following two
sections, I sketch out two possible paths (which are not mutually exclusive) for
state involvement: shifting the default site of costs and logistics and changing the
costs and logistics themselves.
1. Shifting the Default Rules About Payment and Execution of Notice
One way to proactively change some of the circumstances of notice is to
change the default assumptions about how notice is financed and executed. The
concept, in broad strokes, would be simple: each jurisdiction would establish a
new system (or enlarge an existing one) for designing and serving process. The
default assumption would be that all litigants would be entitled to the use of
this service, billed at predetermined rates posted by the relevant court system.
Rates would be determined by certain assumptions about the process being
served, such as the need to serve a defendant personally as opposed to by mail
or electronically, and presumptions about the plaintiff’s ability to pay. This
would not need to be a replacement for private methods of service or waiver of
service. In fact, jurisdictions could utilize pricing models to strive for a sort of
equilibrium: the state would, with little added administrative friction, pay for
and provide notice when needed or desired, but well-designed rates would still
incentivize plaintiffs to engage in private service or waiver methods when those
would be more efficient.
This path would not, on its own, alter too much of the practical landscape
of notice and service of process. It is, however, a first step on an important
rhetorical journey. In the current world of notice and service, courts look rather
helplessly on the possibilities for notice and ask, “how much would notice cost?”
or “how difficult would service of process be for this plaintiff?” as if the need
for notice and the market for process serving exists entirely outside of the
existence and actions of the state. Shifting the default rules about the provision
233. In federal court, Rule 23(c)(2) states that the court must “direct” notice to (b)(3) classes and
“may” direct notice to (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). In practice, the parties draw
up a notice plan which the judge can evaluate and approve.
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and payment of service of process highlights the idea that the costs and
difficulties of notice are not beyond the control of the state. The state itself
enables the underlying conditions that are at least in part responsible for making
the costs and logistics of notice what they are.
2. Changing the Costs and Logistics of Notice Itself by Increased State
Involvement
There is a deeper way in which state involvement with notice and service
of process can fundamentally change the cost and logistics structure of the
existing system. The proposal above would simply shift the default assumptions
about costs and burdens from private parties to the state but would leave most
of the rules and mechanics of the current system in place. When the state
executed service of process, it would mostly be doing what private parties are
doing now. The biggest shift would be that parties could opt out of state
involvement, rather than the current system of demonstrating the need for state
provision or state assistance.
There are, however, much more sophisticated ways in which the state
could become involved with systems of notice and service of process. Doing so
would accomplish more than leveraging economies of scale. It could
fundamentally change some of the invisible circumstances of notice that appear
so intractable and have been overlooked as forces constraining innovation in
notice and service of process itself.
Professor Rose offers one such proposal in Classaction.gov. Her essay
suggests how a centralized governmental program for administration of certain
aspects of class actions, including notice, would improve class action litigation
and, in particular, enhance class participation rates.234 One advantage of such a
plan is that a system of publicly built and maintained databases could aggregate
information, thus improving the accuracy of contacting plaintiffs.235 But Rose’s
key insight is that it is not enough to hope that private individuals or markets
will develop better strategies and technologies for harnessing the power of enotice.236 Proactive state involvement can standardize notices for clarity and
authenticity and trade on the government’s status as a trusted actor.237
Rose’s work is directed at the particular problems that plague class action
notice, administration, and settlement. But there is no reason that these insights
should not apply more broadly to other areas of notice. Recall the difficulties
that most jurisdictions have had in harnessing the power of electronic
communication in any meaningfully systematic way for purposes of notice.238
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Rose, supra note 13, at 491–93.
Id. at 517–18.
Id. at 517–19.
Id. at 512–13.
See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
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Much of this is due to the invisible circumstances that constrain how courts and
lawmakers think of “process” and “service.” But some of the problem is a failure
of governments to proactively participate in the creation of new circumstances
to match evolving technologies.
Judicial rhetoric about e-notice reveals this passivity. Courts and
lawmakers have more or less accepted electronic communication as a given state
of affairs, rather than one that can be shaped by dynamic interaction. Professor
Bartholomew has shown the inherent distrust that many judges have in using
“too much” electronic technology in e-notice.239 This extends to how judges
view e-service in noncomplex cases. In an early leading case authorizing service
by email, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the defendant at hand “had
neither an office nor a door; it had only a computer terminal. If any method of
communication is reasonably calculated to provide [the defendant] with notice,
surely it is email—the method of communication which [it] utilizes and
prefers.”240 But even after this acknowledgement, the court turned to a stern
observation that, as a more general matter, email is untrustworthy and judges
should use discretion in authorizing its use.241 Courts observe that, absent an
affirmative showing by the plaintiff, a court cannot be sure that a particular
email address or social media account actually belongs to or is regularly accessed
by the defendant.242
While these are well-founded concerns, they are not immutable facts.
States have developed systems for e-filing; there is no reason they should not
be able to build out such systems (in the style of the Classaction.gov proposal) to
create a reliable, verifiable method for sending and receiving process, as well as
other government notices. The hope is that the development and
implementation of such systems would be iterative. Undoubtedly, some
methods and designs will prove to be better than others. These systems would
need to standardize communications, identify the best means of connecting with
a recipient (email, text message, social media account, or other avenue), verify
receipt, and develop a format for transmitting lengthy or complex documents
such as a complaint and exhibits, in an easy, readable way.
E-service could not replace all other methods of service. There will always
be a need to reach some defendants personally, whether it is because of the
recipients’ relative access to a computer, or because of the same problems of
evasion of service that have plagued the analogue world for centuries.

239. Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 223.
240. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012); Lim v. Nojiri, No. 10-cv-1480, 2011 WL 2533568, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June
27, 2011).
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The point is not to elevate e-service to the only or even the most preferred
method of service. Rather, it is to see how the invisible circumstances of notice
have blocked innovation, and how the circumstances themselves can be changed
to enable a truly flexible notice regime that matches the aspirations of Mullane’s
flexible standard.
B.

Defund the “Process Police”

The previous section explored how the state can be more proactive in
developing systems, platforms, and performance of notice and service of process
in order to enable positive innovations in notice policy and practice. But one
must note that, while the state has been passive towards participating in and
fostering systems for notice and service, the ways in which the state currently
interacts with the provision of notice can be problematic.
There are still (and will always be) situations in which in-hand service is
the best way of serving notice. Plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis or who
meet other requirements are entitled to enlist the state to help serve process.243
In most jurisdictions, litigants are entitled to ask the state to serve process so
long as they file the necessary paperwork and pay a fee.244 And in most
jurisdictions, this means a law enforcement officer. This Article has already
noted the long-standing relationship between notice and the sheriff who would
serve it.245
In many jurisdictions, service by the state means service by a marshal,246 a
sheriff,247 or an officer of another law enforcement agency. These are often the
same agencies that are responsible for executing prejudgment remedies such as
attachment, or for the enforcement of judgments.248 It is unclear why notice and
service of process are presumptively lumped in with the agencies responsible
for the enforcement aspects of the judiciary. Deteriorating relationships
between law enforcement officers and communities contribute to poor service

243. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
244. Hammond, supra note 227, at 1481.
245. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
246. The federal courts use the U.S. marshals to serve process in these situations. FED. R. CIV. P.
4(c)(3).
247. In Illinois, for example, the county sheriffs are responsible for service of process. 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-202(a) (Westlaw through the end of the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 101st Gen. Assemb.).
248. In New York City, for example, the sheriff’s department is responsible for service of process,
while the marshals are responsible for other judgment enforcement work. See Serving Process, N.Y.C.
DEP’T OF FIN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/finance/sheriff-courts/sheriff-serving-legal-papers.page#:~
:text=The%20Sheriff’s%20Office%20notifies%20defendants,service%20is%20to%20be%20made
[https://perma.cc/WY3Y-G4Y9]. It is unclear, however, whether most residents would be able to
distinguish between various uniformed law enforcement agencies.
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and even sewer service that disproportionately affects poor communities and
communities of color.249
For several years, activists and commentators working in the criminal
justice reform space have been calling for states and the federal government to
“defund the police.”250 During the nationwide protests in the spring of 2020,
that message broke through to its broadest audience yet. One tenet of that
movement is that police forces are tasked with far more responsibilities than are
necessary for maintaining safe and secure communities, that ubiquitous police
involvement leads to poor outcomes for minority communities, and that using
the police to perform such a wide variety of state functions takes resources away
from the trained professionals who are better equipped to address community
issues.251 Activists and commentators have identified numerous functions
currently performed by police that should be redirected to non-police
personnel.252 Service of process should be one of them. Without passing
judgment on an overall goal of defunding or abolishing law enforcement as a
whole, the project of redirection and reassignment of resources is compelling.
Just as the state can be involved in the development of better bureaucratic
systems to create better circumstances for innovations in electronic or mailbased notice and service, the state could be proactive in designing systems for
initiating lawsuits and serving defendants in a way that does not interpose the
state as a hostile or adverse actor.
This idea extends beyond hitching service of process to the current
political moment of questioning the role of law enforcement in various aspects
of society. Notice has always carried with it the weight and threat of state
authority. The invisible circumstances of process and service that have been
discussed in this paper are not an accident of history or a failure of imagination.
The deep-seated need to center natural persons as both the servers and
recipients of tangible documents demonstrates the subtle control operating in
the background. Yes, notice is about protecting rights, facilitating the
opportunity to be heard, and enabling fair judicial process. But it is also a
reminder of the exercise of jurisdiction253 and of the enforcement control
awaiting parties at the other end of litigation.

249. See Kaplan, supra note 47 (describing how sewer service problems falls unevenly on poor
communities with heavy minority populations).
250. Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778, 786 (2021)
(discussing that among the wide variety of police reforms in the last few years, the “defund the police”
movement has gained considerable attention).
251. Id. at 781 (“There are demands to defund the police, to have the people decide how budgets
are allocated, and to give communities control over how to define public safety.”).
252. Id. at 790–92 (touching upon the debate about how some police activity could be carried out
by non-police personnel to achieve the same goals).
253. Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 25–26.
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That exercise of control cannot be completely discarded. Process servers
must sometimes go into dangerous or difficult situations, especially when a
defendant has been evading process.254 But it is unclear why law enforcement
must be the default state officer serving process. Instead, lawmakers should
consider a civilian agency trained to locate and serve adverse parties. A law
enforcement officer might still be necessary in some situations. But this should
be something that the process server asks for from the court, and the law
enforcement officer should not themselves be the process server.
These suggestions demonstrate how the state can change the
circumstances of notice by shifting resources and shifting expectations.
Litigation and circumstances will continue to change with time. But the state
should recognize that it is always a participant in the changing circumstances
and cannot position itself as a mere bystander.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated the hidden structure that supports the
notice doctrine as it plays out in several areas of litigation. What would it look
like to rethink the meaning of service and the meaning of process? At bottom,
it would mean letting go of the idea of a single, or perhaps single plus backup,
method of service. The biggest thing that has changed since the 1950s is that it
is, on balance, both easier and cheaper to find and reach people. On the other
hand, there are also more sources of information that compete for people’s
attention. All of these sources of input into people’s lives, even when
trustworthy and verifiable, may or may not “register,” as it were. The point is
to avoid thinking about notice as a false dichotomy—the old ways or the new
ways? The advantages of technology do not obviate the old standbys of in-hand
personal service and associated substituted service practices. But they should
make us question why technologically enhanced service methods are still so
marginalized.
Going forward, one could further investigate how the invisible
circumstances define and constrain notice in other realms such as bankruptcy,
and even into non-adversarial contexts. Innovation in communication,
commerce, and dispute resolution will continue whether or not lawmakers and
judges choose to make Mullane’s flexible standard into a truly adaptive doctrine.
But the gap will only widen, and with it the court-access problems brought on
254. See David Segal, Big Year for the Bad News Bearers, WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 1998),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/subpoena122498.htm
[https://perma.cc/T8QF-GRK6 (dark archive)] (“[T]he job becomes a high-stakes game of tag -- and
occasionally a dangerous one. Process servers are sometimes threatened, even attacked.”); Ted Kleine,
The Uneasy Life of a Process Server Even Those Living Life in the Fast Lane Aren’t Exempt, CHI. TRIB.
(Mar. 1, 1998), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1998-03-01-9803010424-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6EGU-7VCN].
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by notice that is difficult, expensive, or poorly executed. The time has come to
refigure the underlying structure of the standard in order to facilitate needed
change.
APPENDIX
The chart below provides a state-by-state description of the laws regarding
the permissibility and enforcement of cognovit notes. Forty-five states either
permit confession-of-judgment clauses in some form or have reported decisions
stating that out-of-state judgments rendered pursuant to confession-ofjudgment clauses are enforceable due to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The
remaining five states do not have any cases explicitly stating that such
judgments are enforceable; however, none of these states have caselaw that
suggests that the confession-of-judgments issue is somehow outside of or an
exception to full faith and credit.
State

Do They Allow
Cognovit Notes?

Alabama

Allowed under full faith
and credit.

Alaska

Permitted by caselaw
and statute.
Recognizes full faith and
credit on sister-state
judgments; unable to
find a case stating that
cognovit judgments are
honored via full faith and
credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit. Note that the
case cited here held that
the
original
Pennsylvania
court
lacked jurisdiction in the
first place to rule on the
cognovit note, and
therefore the note was
null under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.

Arizona

Arkansas

Source
Ohio Bureau of Credits, Inc. v.
Steinberg, 199 So. 246, 247–48
(Ala. Ct. App. 1940).
Princiotta v. Mun. of Anchorage,
785 P.2d 559, 560 (Alaska 1990).
Lofts v. Superior Ct. ex rel.
Maricopa Cnty., 682 P.2d 412, 413
(Ariz. 1984).

Strick Lease, Inc. v. Juels, 780
S.W.2d 594, 594–96 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1989).
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California

Allowed under full faith
and credit.

Colorado

Recognizes full faith and
credit on sister-state
judgments; unable to
find a case stating that
cognovit judgments are
honored via full faith and
credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.

Connecticut

Delaware

Florida

Recognizes full faith and
credit on sister-state
judgments; unable to
find a case stating that
cognovit judgments are
honored via full faith and
credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.

Georgia

Allowed under full faith
and credit.

Hawaii

Recognizes full faith and
credit on sister-state
judgments; unable to
find a case stating that
cognovit judgments are
honored via full faith and
credit.
Recognizes full faith and
credit on sister-state
judgments; unable to
find a case stating that
cognovit judgments are
honored via full faith and
credit.

Idaho

[Vol. 99

Cap. Tr., Inc. v. Tri-Nat’l Dev.
Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 365
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
Marworth, Inc. v. McGuire, 810
P.2d 653, 657 (Colo. 1991).

Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Waterbury,
451 A.2d 291, 293 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1982).
Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps.’
Ret. Sys., 74 A.3d 612, 615–16
(Del. 2013).

Trauger v. A.J. Spagnol Lumber
Co., 442 So. 2d 182, 182 (Fla.
1983).
Melnick v. Bank of Highwood, 259
S.E.2d 667, 669 (Ga. Ct. App.
1979).
Cobb v. Willis, 752 P.2d 106, 109
(Haw. Ct. App. 1988).

Andre v. Morrow, 680 P.2d 1355,
1362–63 (Idaho 1984).
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Illinois

See law review note on
cognovit notes in Illinois
and its constitutional
implications on full faith
and credit.

Indiana

Does not allow cognovit
notes.
However,
cognovit
notes
are
allowed under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause
when the cognovit note
is issued by a competent
jurisdiction in another
state.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.

Iowa
Kansas

Kentucky

Allowed under full faith
and credit.

Louisiana

Recognizes full faith and
credit on sister-state
judgments; unable to
find a case stating that
cognovit judgments are
honored via full faith and
credit.
Recognizes full faith and
credit on sister-state
judgments; unable to
find a case stating that
cognovit judgments are
honored via full faith and
credit. This case cites
and distinguishes a
federal Third Circuit
decision in which that
court had, under other

Maine
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Cindy F. Wile, Note, Confessions of
Judgement in Illinois: The Need for
Change Persists, 10 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 141, 143 (1978) (discussing
cognovit notes in Illinois and its
constitutional implications on full
faith and credit).
EBF Partners, LLC v. Novabella,
Inc., 96 N.E.3d 87, 88 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2018); Cox v. First Nat’l
Bank of Woodlawn, 426 N.E.2d
426, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).

Acme Feeds, Inc. v. Berg, 4
N.W.2d 430, 432 (Iowa 1942).
Hankin v. Graphic Tech., Inc., 222
P.3d 523, 531 (Kan. Ct. App.
2010).
Anderson v. Reconstruction Fin.
Corp., 136 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1940).
State Dept. of Health & Res. v.
Bethune, 618 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (La.
Ct. App. 1993).

Roy v. Buckley, 698 A.2d 497, 502
n.6 (Me. 1997) (citing Choi v. Kim,
50 F.3d 244, 249–51 (3d Cir.
1995)).
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Maryland
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circumstances,
found
that
the
particular
confession of judgment
clause at issue did not
satisfy due process.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.

Massachusetts

Allowed under full faith
and credit.

Michigan

Recognizes full faith and
credit on sister-state
judgments; unable to
find a case stating that
cognovit judgments are
honored via full faith and
credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit. Note that the
case cited here held that
the original Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction in the
first place to rule on the
cognovit note, and
therefore the note was
null under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.

Minnesota

Mississippi
Missouri

Montana
Nebraska

Nevada

Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.

[Vol. 99

Goshen Run Homeowner Ass’n,
Inc. v. Cisneros, 223 A.3d 917, 934
(Md. 2020).
C.F. Tr., Inc. v. Peterson, No.
CIV. A. 96-1375 H, 1997 WL
184432, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 6, 1997).
Hare v. Starr Commonwealth
Corp., 813 N.W.2d 752, 758–59
(Mich. Ct. App. 2011).

Hutson v. Christensen, 203
N.W.2d 535, 538 (Minn. 1972).

Dickson v. Lindsay, 107 So. 2d 732,
732 (Miss. 1958).
Metro. Lumber Co. v. Dodge, 567
S.W.2d 729, 731 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978).
Wamsley v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co.,
178 P.3d 102, 113–14 (Mont. 2008).
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of
Colo. Springs v. Wyant, 472
N.W.2d 386, 390 (Neb. 1991).
Rosenstein v. Steele, 747 P.2d 230,
230 (Nev. 1987).
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New Hampshire
New Jersey

New Mexico

Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit. Note that the
case cited here held that
the Pennsylvania court
lacked jurisdiction in the
first place to rule on the
cognovit note, and
therefore the note was
null under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.

New York

Allowed under full faith
and credit.

North Carolina

Allowed under full faith
and credit. Note that the
case cited here held that
the Ohio court lacked
jurisdiction in the first
place to rule on the
cognovit note, and
therefore the note was
null under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.

North Dakota
Ohio

Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania

Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Allowed under full faith
and
credit.
Allows
cognovit notes.
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Wilson v. Shepard, 469 A.2d 1359,
1360–61 (N.H. 1983).
Tara Enters., Inc. v. Daribar
Mgmt. Corp., 848 A.2d 27, 35
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).

Mountain States Fixture Co. v.
Daskalos, 303 P.2d 698, 699–700
(N.M. 1956).
Fiore v. Oakwood Plaza Shopping
Ctr., Inc., 585 N.E.2d 364, 366
(N.Y. 1991).
Gardner v. Tallmadge, 700 S.E.2d
755, 757–58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).

1st Summit Bank v. Samuelson,
580 N.W.2d 132, 132 (N.D. 1998).
Fifth Third Bank, N.A. v. Maple
Leaf Expansion, Inc., 934 N.E.2d
366, 372 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
U.S. Mortg. v. Laubach, 73 P.3d
887, 895 (Okla. 2003).
Ames v. Ames, 652 P.2d 1280,
1282–83 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
Neducsin v. Caplan, 121 A.3d 498,
502, 510 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
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Rhode Island

South Carolina

South Dakota
Tennessee

Texas
Utah

Vermont

Virginia

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Recognizes full faith and
credit on sister-state
judgments; unable to
find a case stating that
cognovit judgments are
honored via full faith and
credit. Statutes prohibit
confession of judgments
against
individuals;
unable to find case law,
but it can be inferred
that
commercial
confessions
are
permissible.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Permitted per caselaw
and statute.

Recognizes full faith and
credit on sister-state
judgments; unable to
find a case stating that
cognovit judgments are
honored via full faith and
credit.
Recognizes full faith and
credit on sister-state
judgments; unable to
find a case stating that

[Vol. 99

Hawes v. Reilly, 184 A.3d 661,
666–67 (R.I. 2018); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 19-14.8-28(a)(15) (LEXIS
through Ch. 424 of the 2021 Sess.).

Law Firm of Paul L. Erickson v.
Boykin, 681 S.E.2d 575, 578 (S.C.
2009).
Arnoldy v. Mahoney, 791 N.W.2d
645, 650 (S.D. 2010).
Guseinov v. Synergy Ventures,
Inc., 467 S.W.3d 920, 921 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2014).
Roark v. Sweigart, 848 S.W.2d
387, 387 (Tex. App. 1993).
Bradburn v. Alarm Prot. Tech.,
LLC, 2019 UT 33, ¶ 14, 449 P.3d
20; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-205
(LEXIS through the 2021 1st Spec.
Sess. of the 64th Leg.); UTAH R.
CIV. P. 58A.
Wursthaus, Inc. v. Cerreta, 539
A.2d 534, 535–36 (Vt. 1987).

Coghill v. Boardwalk Regency
Corp., 396 S.E.2d 838, 840 (Va.
1990).
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Washington

West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

cognovit judgments are
honored via full faith and
credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Allowed under full faith
and credit.
Permitted by case law
and statute.
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Copeland Planned Futures, Inc. v.
Obenchain, 510 P.2d 654, 657–59
(Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
Perkins v. Hall, 17 S.E.2d 795,
798–99 (W. Va. 1941).
Ellis v. Gordon, 231 N.W. 585, 586
(Wis. 1930).
Westring v. Cheyenne Nat’l Bank,
393 P.2d 119, 121 (1964).
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